A Snitch in Time: An Historical Sketch of Black Informing During Slavery by Dennis, Andrea L.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2013
A Snitch in Time: An Historical Sketch of Black
Informing During Slavery
Andrea L. Dennis
University of Georgia School of Law, aldennis@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Andrea L. Dennis, A Snitch in Time: An Historical Sketch of Black Informing During Slavery , 97 Marq. L. Rev. 279 (2013),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/960
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 37 Side A      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 37 Side A      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
DENNIS-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2014 12:31 PM 
 
A SNITCH IN TIME: AN HISTORICAL 
SKETCH OF BLACK INFORMING DURING 
SLAVERY 
ANDREA L. DENNIS? 
Although potentially offering the benefits of crime control and 
sentence reduction, some Blacks are convinced that cooperation with 
criminal investigations and prosecutions should be avoided.  One factor 
contributing to this perspective is America’s reliance on Black informants 
to police and socially control Blacks during slavery, the Civil Rights 
Movement, and the Wars on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs.  Notwithstanding 
this historical justification for non-cooperation, only a few informant law 
and policy scholars have examined closely the Black community’s 
relationship with informing. Furthermore, even among this small group, 
noticeably absent are historical explorations of Black America’s 
experience with informing during slavery.  Drawn using a variety of 
primary and secondary historical and legal sources, this Article sketches 
the socio-legal creation, use, and regulation of Black informants in the 
Black community during slavery, as well as Black society’s response at 
that time.  In developing a snapshot of the past, the Article reveals many 
similarities between the Black experience with informing while enslaved 
and in contemporary times.  Consideration of these resemblances during 
present debate on the topic of cooperation may help to facilitate nuanced 
conversation as to whether and how modern Black citizens and the 
government should approach using informants in current times. 
 
 ?Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  Thanks are owed to 
Alfred L. Brophy, Stephen Clowney, Michael Rich, Lori Ringhand, and the Mid-Atlantic 
Criminal Law Research Collective.  University of Georgia Law Librarian Thomas J. Striepe 
was immensely helpful in securing sources.  Valuable research assistance was provided by 
Rachel Hudgins.  All errors or omissions are my own.  Thanks for everything, Plum. 
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2013] A SNITCH IN TIME 281 
“Young generations of African-Americans, unmindful of their legacy of 
resistance against the slavery system, don’t understand that snitching is 
not cool.” 
—Mumia Abu-Jamal1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The government relies upon a large, unregulated collection of 
snitches to ensure the operation of the modern criminal justice system.2  
Government officials claim snitches are necessary for efficient and 
effective crime-fighting.3  Nevertheless, legal scholarship has 
documented a host of mischiefs bred by dependence on snitches.4  It is 
especially troubling that these harms disproportionately fall upon the 
Black community, specifically those individuals who dwell in urban, 
impoverished, high-crime neighborhoods.5 
Black viewpoints on snitching and informing are varied.6  A 
particularly controversial mindset is reflected in the “Stop Snitching” 
 
1. Mumia Abu-Jamal, The Snitch Factor, REFUSE & RESIST! (Jan. 14, 1999), 
http://www.refuseandresist.org/big_brother/020699maj398.html. 
2. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 1–3 (2009) [hereinafter NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL 
INFORMANTS]; Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 645 (2004) [hereinafter Natapoff, Communal 
Consequences]. 
3. See MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 12, 14 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing former law enforcement officers’ recognition 
of the necessity of informants); Rick Hampson, Anti-snitch Campaign Riles Police, 
Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2006, at A1 (quoting Pittsburgh police commander: 
“Informers are a necessary evil”). 
4. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 36–38; Natapoff, 
Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 646. 
5. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 35, 118. 
6. In this Article, I use “snitching” or “snitch” to exemplify individuals who expect or 
actually receive a government-conferred benefit in exchange for providing officials with 
incriminating information.  I use the broader terms “inform” or “informant” or “informing” 
for those who provide information regardless of benefit, thus including snitches as well as 
bystander and victim-witnesses.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
an informant as: “One who informs against another; esp., one who confidentially supplies 
information to the police about a crime, sometimes in exchange for a reward or special 
treatment”).  I believe the broader concept is appropriately considered alongside the 
narrower term because limiting discussion to snitches may obscure the complexities of the 
issue: some Blacks discourage any type of informing and all types of informants may be 
troublesome to the criminal justice system. 
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ethic revealed by the 2004 publication of an underground video 
recording filmed in a Baltimore City neighborhood.7  Today, Stop 
Snitching is often associated generally with urban or hip-hop culture.8  
The contours of the credo are debatable.  At a minimum, Stop Snitching 
dictates that those engaging in criminal behavior not incriminate others 
engaging in crime.9  In its strongest form, the expression prescribes that 
community residents—law-abiding or otherwise—refuse to provide 
information to government authorities for criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.10 
Widespread awareness of the Stop Snitching idiom has provided a 
platform for robust debate—publicly and within the Black community—
 
 Among scholars and the general public, there is no uniform agreement on the meaning 
or use of these terms.  See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 81–82 (2009) (distinguishing between snitches and witnesses); HARNEY & CROSS, 
supra note 3, at 31 (“All people who are sources of information, generically, and in the broad 
sense of the term, could be referred to as informers.”); BAKARI KITWANA, THE HIP HOP 
GENERATION 68 (2002) (“[I]nformants (also known as snitches) who agree to plead guilty 
and testify as government witnesses in exchange for special considerations, including 
leniency . . . .”); Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 645 n.1, 652 (limiting her 
work to criminal informants who receive a government-conferred benefit in exchange for 
providing information); Marc Lamont Hill, Damned If You Do.  Damned if You Don’t, 
BARBERSHOP NOTEBOOKS, http://www.popmatters.com/pm/column/hill060224-1/ (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
7. See Jeremy Kahn, The Story of a Snitch, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2007, at 80, 86, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/the-story-of-a-snitch/305703 
(describing the Stop Fucking Snitchin’ video and ethic, and spread of the motto); see also 
STOP FUCKIN SNITCHIN’ (Skinny Surge Records 2004).  Subsequently, the federal 
government prosecuted a primary participant in the film on racketeering charges.  See Press 
Release, U.S. Atty’s Office, E. Shore TTP Leader & Balt. TTP Bloods Member Who 
Produced “Stop Snitching” Videos Sentenced to Lengthy Prison Terms for Racketeering 
Activities (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba 
062510.htm (describing the prosecution of video producer). 
8. See Touré, A Snitch Like Me, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at 3 (“I come from the hip-
hop generation, in which snitching against a black person is treason.”). 
9. See Tom Farrey, ‘Snitching’ Controversy Goes Well Beyond ‘Melo, ESPN MAGAZINE 
(Jan. 18, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=farrey_tom&id=2296
590 (quoting the producer of the Stop Snitching video: “The people in this documentary are 
referring to fellow criminals who snitch.  And they’re saying, stop doing that.  You did the 
crime, you do the time.”). 
10. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
STOP SNITCHING PHENOMENON: BREAKING THE CODE OF SILENCE 10 (2009) (describing a 
“campaign urging people to ‘stop snitching’ when they are witnesses to, or victims of, crime”); 
Kahn, supra note 7 at 88; 60 Minutes: Stop Snitchin’, (CBS television broadcast Apr. 22, 2007), 
transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/19/60minutes/main2704565.sht
ml (“‘Stop snitchin’ once meant ‘don’t tell on others if you’re caught committing a 
crime.’ . . .  [I]t has come to mean something much more dangerous: ‘don’t cooperate with the 
police—no matter who you are.’”). 
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2013] A SNITCH IN TIME 283 
on snitching and informing.  Citizens from widely varying walks of life 
have weighed in on Stop Snitching.  Local community residents directly 
affected by informing and government officials charged with policing 
those communities have made known their perspectives.11  It has 
attracted the attention of legal scholars.12  Within the Black community, 
entertainers, journalists, public intellectuals, and academics have also 
contributed their viewpoints either for or against snitching and, more 
broadly, informing.13 
Some proponents and opponents of informing make arguments 
reflecting modern-day practical concerns.  Advocates for informing 
argue that it is necessary to prevent and solve crime, particularly drug 
crime and Black-on-Black crime, and that choosing to inform is 
understandable in light of the extreme criminal penalties faced by one 
who does not inform.14  In response, their adversaries point to the litany 
 
11. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 10, at 14; Ronald 
Moten, The Real Meaning of ‘Snitching,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007, at B2. 
12. See Michael L. Rich, Lessons of Disloyalty in the World of Criminal Informants, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1493, 1513–18 (2012).  See generally Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching 
Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257 (2011). 
13. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 85–87, 95–96, 98–100 (describing contested views 
within the hip-hop community and regular citizens from the perspective of a Black law 
professor, and advocating for noncooperation in some instances); Tony Norman, A Snitch in 
Time Sometimes Saves Me and Mine, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 16, 2006, at A2 
(describing a black journalist’s account of personal and communal debates over snitching in 
the context of raising three Black sons); Touré, supra note 8 (describing a Black journalist’s 
personal, internal debate over calling police about a crack house in his Brooklyn 
neighborhood); Hill, supra note 6 (describing the complexity underlying the Stop Snitching 
mantra from the perspective of a Black education professor).  Iconic rapper Chuck D publicly 
stated: 
Rap is bridging jail mentality straight into the middle schools via radio and video 
overdosing.  There’s a big anti-snitching thing moving in the hoods of America, but 
dig this—the term ‘snitch’ was best applied to those that ratted revolutionaries like 
Huey P Newton, Bobby Seale, Che Guevera to the fascist governments during the 
60’s and 70s.  Let’s not let stupid cats use hip hop to again twist this meaning for the 
sake of some ‘innerganghood’ violent drug thug crime dogs, who’ve sacrificed the 
black community’s women and children.  Not the same . . . and rap needs to speak 
and protect the people sometimes and not contribute to genocidal systems. 
Chuck D, Chuck D’s Christmas List: What I Should Want in HIP HOP 2006, HIP HOP 
SPORTS NETWORK (Dec. 14, 2005, 12:24 PM), http://hiphopsports.typepad.com/hhsn/2005/12/
chuck_ds_christ.html. 
14. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 79–100 (summarizing the debate surrounding 
informing); JUAN WILLIAMS, ENOUGH: THE PHONY LEADERS, DEAD END MOVEMENTS, 
AND CULTURE OF FAILURE THAT ARE UNDERMINING BLACK AMERICA—AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT 111–18 (2006) (decrying the growth of the Stop Snitching movement for 
its increase in Black crime). 
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of bad outcomes for already marginalized Black communities, including: 
unnecessary and disproportionate incarceration of Black men; increased 
crime; government abuses such as police brutality; unreliable 
convictions; individual and communal intimidation and retaliation that 
the government is unwilling or unable to prevent; and a fractionated and 
suspicious Black community.15 
America’s history of criminal justice enforcement of and within the 
Black community—both recent and centuries old—provides another 
rationale for some Black Americans who oppose informing.  During the 
American Civil Rights Movement, the United States government 
seeded Black communities with confidential informants instructed to 
monitor and report on the activities of movement participants—both 
famous and ordinary—as well as to act as agents provocateur.16  
Following on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement are the now 
decades-old Wars on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs.17  During these “wars,” 
state and federal governments have relied heavily on criminal suspects, 
jailhouse informants, and street-based confidential informants to police 
communities, particularly Black ones.18 
Reversing course in time, the Black American experience during 
slavery also offers a rationale against informing.19  Quite pointedly, 
 
15. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 69, 104–06, 108–09, 116–
18, 129–34; OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 10, at 3, 20–21 (citing 
a community activist’s opinion that an unfair criminal justice system discourages cooperation, 
this report was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing 
Services); Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 646, 688, 690–92. 
16. See KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”: THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK 
AMERICA, 1960–1972, at 261, 267 (1989). 
17. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 128 (“Inner-city America 
has been living with drug informants for the duration of the war on drugs—over twenty 
years.”); Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars” on 
Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009) (“Within the criminal 
justice system, a vibrant snitching institution operates to assist the government in its ‘wars’ on 
drugs, crime, and gangs.”). 
18. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 128; Natapoff, Communal 
Consequences, supra note 2, at 692. 
19. BUTLER, supra note 6, at 99 (citing the use of an informant to uncover Denmark 
Vesey’s slave rebellion plot); Moten, supra note 11; Abu-Jamal, supra note 1 (citing examples 
of slave rebellions and revolts that failed because of snitches); Regina N. Bradley, G.I.I.F.T. 
(Get It In Friday Thoughts) Vol. I, RED CLAY SCHOLAR (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://redclayscholar.blogspot.com/2010/02/giift-get-it-in-friday-thoughts-vol-i.html (citing 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN 
AMERICAN SLAVE (1845), reprinted in EARLY AFRICAN-AMERICAN CLASSICS 13, 97 
(Anthony Appiah ed., 1990)) (discussing Frederick Douglass’ unwillingness to reveal how he 
escaped slavery). 
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Mumia Abu-Jamal, journalist and former Pennsylvania death row 
inmate, who is quoted to open this article, wrote: 
Throughout the long, tortured centuries of oppression against 
Blacks in America, a special contempt was reserved for those 
who dared snitch against the endangered slave community, 
people who made their “livings” by selling out their own people, 
sending information to dreaded slave-catchers in the South, who 
used the infamous Fugitive Slave Act to track and re-enslave 
those who dared escape their fiendish clutches.20 
Thus, since its earliest days, the United States’ approach to policing 
Blacks’ alleged criminality was often predicated on using Black citizens 
to target other Black citizens, sometimes fairly and sometimes 
shockingly unfairly.  And these Black experiences of criminal justice 
policy are claimed to have bred deep distrust of government and 
informing.21 
Legal scholars of informant law and policy tend to only modestly 
discuss historical aspects of the practice, and noticeably absent from 
even these brief discussions is Black America’s historical experience 
with informing.  Two exceptions exist.  Professor Randall Kennedy—in 
support of a larger work on race and criminal justice—wrote briefly 
regarding the FBI’s destructive use of informants in the Black 
community during the Civil Rights Movement.22  Professor Alexandra 
Natapoff richly explored the harms of snitching during the War on 
Drugs, particularly for the Black community.23  Notwithstanding the 
writings of Kennedy and Natapoff, at best, most informant law scholars 
have cursorily referenced the FBI’s use of informants to investigate 
Black leaders and organizations during the Civil Rights era, which 
coincided with the Vietnam War era.24  Thus, Black snitching and 
 
20. Abu-Jamal, supra note 1. 
21. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 99; Norman, supra note 13 (mentioning the impact of 
slavery); see also 60 Minutes: Stop Snitchin’, supra note 10 (discussing the “Stop Snitchin’” 
motto and Blacks’ reluctance to talk to police); Abu-Jamal, supra note 1 (citing government 
activities during the Civil Rights Movement). 
22. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 107–13 (1997).  History 
professor Kenneth O’Reilly documented in painstaking detail the FBI’s program of 
informants in the Black community.  O’REILLY, supra note 16, at 107, 224, 265–70, 274, 292, 
301, 306, 309, 334, 337, 346, 356. 
23. See Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 692. 
24. Generally speaking, scholars detailing the historical use of informants point to their 
use in ancient Greek and Roman society, Biblical times, the Middle Ages, and 
Enlightenment.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
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informing during slavery remain completely unexamined.  This omission 
is striking in light of the centrality of slavery to the Black American and 
United States experience, historical justifications offered for Blacks’ 
unwillingness to inform, and the disproportionate impact of modern 
informing policies and practices on Black communities. 
This Article fills a gap in knowledge by sketching the socio-legal 
creation, use, and regulation of informants in the Black community 
during slavery and the Black community’s response at that time.25  This 
Article proceeds in six parts, using primary and secondary historical and 
legal sources from a variety of locales.  The various primary sources 
referenced include slave codes, legislative and judicial petitions, case 
law, and narratives.  The petitions and narratives are the products of 
enslaved as well as free Blacks, and Whites.  These first person accounts 
are often profound and moving, thus at times these sources are heavily 
quoted.  Secondary sources include academic works by historians—legal 
and non-legal—of slavery. 
Part II describes Whites’ need for and cultivation of Black 
informants who were vital to the White community’s prevention, 
 
INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 1–6 (2002) (providing an overview of 
informing in a variety of historical contexts).  Not surprisingly, given the historical connection 
between the English and American legal systems, scholars describe the development of a 
government-backed system of informants in England and translation to policing in the 
American colonies.  See, e.g., id. at 6; Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in 
Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1992) (surveying the history of agreements between 
informants and prosecutors in exchange for cooperation in criminal cases).  Moving forward 
in the U.S. history timeline, the American government’s formal use of informants has been 
linked historically with post-WWI Bolshevism (the Red Scare), McCarthyism (the Second 
Red Scare), the Vietnam War era, and Mafia RICO prosecutions.  See, e.g., BLOOM, supra, at 
7, 81–92; Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism, 71 
SOC. RES. 1041, 1049, 1058, 1064 (2004).  Finally, the present-day snitching institution in 
relation to the War on Drugs and War on Terror has received treatment.  See generally 
Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2; Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 687, 715–38 (2010). 
25. The institutionalization of Black slavery gradually occurred over time through social 
and legal means.  A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD 20–22 (1978).  In 1619, the first Africans arrived in Jamestown, Virginia—
likely as indentured servants.  Id. at 20.  By 1660, statutory law in the colony of Virginia began 
to recognize life-long servitude by Blacks.  Id. at 34 (citing Act of English Running Away with 
Negroes, Act XXII (1660), in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL 
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 
1619, at 26 (William Waller Hening ed., N.Y.C., R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823)).  By 1705, 
Virginia had formally and fully excluded Blacks from legal and social society.  
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra at 58.  The other colonies followed Virginia’s lead.  Id. at 60.  Slavery 
continued in the colonies and then the states until the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified on 
December 6, 1865.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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detection, investigation, and prosecution of Black misconduct affecting 
White communal or personal interests.  Informants were used to police 
a wide assortment of offending behavior and were deemed especially 
helpful at preventing and squelching rebellions.26  Part II also 
distinguishes among informants.  Some cooperators merely provided 
information while others actively assisted Whites in regulating Black 
misconduct.27 
Blacks confronted with making a choice as to whether to inform 
likely weighed multiple factors.  Part III lists and exemplifies 
commonplace factors.  Weighing in on the side of informing were loyalty 
to owner, preservation of one’s life or status, communal self-regulation, 
attainment of liberty or criminal leniency, and financial reward.28  
Communal solidarity, resistance ethic, and fear of retaliation, as well as 
protection of others countenanced not informing.29  Religious conviction 
was a swing factor depending on the particular individual or 
circumstance.30 
Debates on informing commonly implicate questions of loyalty.  In 
so keeping, Parts IV through VI more closely examine three loyalty-
related themes exposed in Parts II and III: (1) the creditable existence 
of what may be termed a “code of silence” held by Blacks during 
slavery; (2) the revelation of slave rebellions and runaways as the 
ultimate betrayal by one Black person of another Black person; and (3) 
the claimed willingness of domestic slaves to freely inform to their 
owners out of misplaced loyalty.  Part IV argues that some Blacks 
rejected the legal and socially based opportunities and motivations to 
inform.  Such individual or communal response offered a means to resist 
White oppression and build group loyalty.  Notwithstanding this 
possible code of silence, some Blacks did inform on other Blacks, and 
Part V offers descriptions of arguably the utmost form of betrayal—the 
disclosure of information regarding a slave rebellion or the location of a 
runaway slave. 
Part VI briefly defends domestic, or house, slaves who hold an 
especially negative place in the mind of the modern Black community.  
This Part speaks to the allegation that domestic slaves frequently and 
 
26. See infra Part II.B. 
27. See infra Part II.B. 
28. See infra Part III. 
29. See infra Part III. 
30. See infra Part III.E. 
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unabashedly betrayed their fellow enslaved, sometimes for little benefit.  
Part VI concludes that while undoubtedly some house slaves did inform, 
it is unfair to malign the entire class of domestic slaves. 
Finally, in light of the reality that some Blacks did inform, Part VII 
describes the impact of informing on the Black community.  Not 
surprisingly, informant betrayals bred distrust and disunity, both of 
which are posited as modern-day consequences of informing in the 
Black community.31  Black informants arguably also engendered 
inaction among slaves who might have been reluctant to engage in 
rebellious misconduct for fear of being exposed to Whites.32 
The Article concludes by mentioning future avenues of historical 
inquiry on Black informing during slavery and ruminating on the 
implications of the current state of knowledge on contemporary 
informant law and policy.  This Article does not, however, offer any 
normative or prescriptive conclusions.  Thus, no opinion is offered as to 
whether Blacks should continue or give up reliance on slavery, and 
history more generally, to support an anti-cooperative ethic.  Similarly, 
whether government officials should cease employing informants to 
police Blacks because of the painful experiences of Blacks with 
informing throughout American history remains unresolved.  Until such 
time as the historical picture of the Black experience with informing is 
flush, answers to those matters are speculative. 
The way in which Black people experienced informing during 
slavery is surely but one factor among a multitude of factors influencing 
modern Black Americans’ perspectives on informing.  Ideally, the 
historical information herein will be expanded upon and then coupled 
with information—extant or to be discovered—regarding the Black 
experience with informing during other historical eras such as 
Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Civil Rights Movement, and the War on 
Drugs.  Black America’s experience during these times also likely has 
both independent and cumulative force in establishing modern attitudes 
on informing.  Once complete, this collective information should 
facilitate nuanced conversation as to whether historically grounded 
justifications for anti-cooperation today are sensible; whether the Black 
community should be demonized for holding any anti-cooperative ethic; 
whether Blacks—individually and communally—should or can endorse 
 
31. See infra Part VII. 
32. See infra Part VII.  
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informing; and how current policy should respond in light of the Black 
community’s viewpoints.33 
Unquestionably, obvious and significant differences between the 
Black community’s position in today’s society and during slave times 
serve to undermine reference to slavery as a rationalization for not 
informing.  Most apparently, Blacks today are not slaves and so they are 
not focused on the most basic recognition of their individual and 
collective humanity.  Relatedly, informing on fellow slave subjects poses 
greater moral dilemmas than informing on a neighborhood drug 
dealer.34  Also, even if marginalized, Blacks currently receive 
significantly more social and legal protections than during slavery.  
Finally, during slavery, the prime beneficiary of law and legal policy—
including that related to informants—was White society, while Black 
informants currently are credited with benefiting Black communities, 
particularly those besieged by crime.  This non-exhaustive list only 
touches the surface; certainly, more distinctions may be offered. 
 
In light of these dissimilarities, concluding that no comparison can or 
should be made between experiences and positions today and in the past 
is tenable.  On the other hand, drawing a line from past to present by 
recovering the experiences of slave and free Blacks with informing 
offers a sounder position from which to understand the modern Black 
community’s ambivalence regarding informing.  Thus, even without 
drawing normative conclusions or offering prescriptive solutions, this 
Article importantly advances our understanding as to why 
contemporary Blacks may distrust informants and government 
promotion of informing, which in turn, at a minimum, may undergird 
our response. 
II. THE DEMAND FOR BLACK INFORMANTS 
Slave owners, and Whites more widely, needed Black informants to 
protect personal and communal interests as well as to preserve the 
institution of slavery.  Information about the misdeeds of Blacks was 
helpful to Whites, but Whites also benefited from the active efforts of 
Blacks to police other Blacks.  Governments promoted informing by 
 
33. See Alfred L. Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 233, 
233 (2013) (describing applied legal history as “deeply researched, serious scholarship that is 
motivated by, engages with, or speaks to contemporary issues”). 
34. See Norman, supra note 13; Bradley, supra note 19. 
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Blacks.  State codes expressly authorized legislatures to reward 
“informers” who acted as private prosecutors.35  It is highly likely, 
though, that Blacks were not eligible for these “informer” rewards, only 
Whites.36  Instead, legislatures enacted distinct code provisions allowing 
slaves in limited circumstances to be compensated for informing.37 
 
35. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (“Statutes providing for actions by a 
common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than that 
given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and in this country 
ever since the foundation of our Government.”); Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New 
Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 81, 157–67 (1994) (describing the history of informers in England and the United States). 
36. Statutory language was not clear as to whether slaves and free Blacks could be 
“informers” (i.e., private prosecutors).  See Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 157–66.  Where 
White misconduct was at issue, courts would have been highly unlikely to interpret statutes to 
allow slaves to collect these rewards.  See LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 16 (June 7, 1806), in 2 
STATUTES ON SLAVERY: SLAVERY, RACE, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700–1872, 
at 47, 50 (Paul Finkleman ed., 1988) [hereinafter 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY].  Slaves could 
not legally own property.  LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 15 (June 7, 1806), in 2 STATUTES ON 
SLAVERY, supra at 50.  Slaves could not offer evidence or testimony against Whites, only 
against Blacks.  LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 16 (June 7, 1806), in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, 
supra at 50.  Possibly, free Blacks or other non-Whites could be “informers” in order to 
maintain the distinction between slaves and all others; yet, case law suggests that such a 
conclusion is not forgone.  In a civil case, a White property owner argued that Blacks could 
not be “informers.”  Ruth v. Maryland, 20 Md. 436, 438 (1864).  A free Black property owner 
filed suit concerning the destruction by a neighboring White owner of a tree alleged to be on 
the plaintiff’s property.  Id. at 436.  Though an “informer” is competent to be a witness, the 
defendant argued that a negro, “free or slave,” could not be an “informer” because he was 
incompetent to testify (presumably against a White person).  Id. at 438.  The defendant 
further argued that a slave could not be an “informer” because he could not own a boundary 
and cannot initiate a qui tam action.  Id. at 439.  Though the issue was not resolved by the 
court, the case provides some sense of the tenor of the argument as to whether a slave or free 
Black could be an “informer.”  See generally id. at 438–42. 
37. See, e.g., HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 143 (5th ed. 
1983) (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within This Province, and for 
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from 
Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, §§ 13–14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF GEORGIA, FROM ITS SETTLEMENT AS A BRITISH PROVINCE, IN 1775, TO THE 
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1880, INCLUSIVE, 426, 430–31 (Horatio Marbury & 
William H. Crawford, eds., Savannah, Seymour, Woolhopter & Stebbins 1802) [hereinafter 
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA]).  During slavery, legislatures enacted 
statutes called Slave Codes (or occasionally Black Codes) designed to legally effectuate the 
total submission of slaves to their owners.  See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 25, at 9; Joseph 
Conan Thompson, Toward a More Humane Oppression: Florida’s Slave Codes, 1821–1861, 71 
FLA. HIST. Q. 324, 324 (1993).  Within these slave codes are informant provisions.  See, e.g., 
LOUISIANA BLACK CODE § 5 (June 7, 1806), in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 
54–55. 
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A. Necessity of Informants 
Whites relied on informants out of necessity.  Because Whites were 
outsiders to the slave community, and thus not personally privy to the 
inner workings of that community, detection and investigation of much 
slave misconduct would have been nearly impossible without 
information from slaves.  If Whites were unable to access such otherwise 
secreted information, their personal safety, communal safety, financial 
interests, and ultimately the institution of slavery would have been 
seriously threatened.38  Consequently, the necessity for protection of 
White interests was the driving factor respecting the types of offenses or 
misconduct meriting societal endorsement of slave informing.39  
Commonly, Whites sought slave informants to detect and prosecute 
offenses that could result in the loss of White lives.40  Additionally, 
informing was necessary to protect financial interests.41 
 
Because slaves could attack or kill their owners, owner awareness of 
what was happening among their slaves was a vital preventive measure.  
Some owners were desperate for information to protect their personal 
safety.42  For example, Martha L. Nelson, a slave owner, wrote her state 
Governor seeking her slave’s pardon because he was a valuable 
informant.43  She wrote: 
[He] would inform on the negroes, as soon as any white person 
would, if he knew or suspected anything wrong was plan[n]ing 
among them . . . I am almost a maniac from the loss of sleep, now 
in the dept[h] of night I write, beseeching you to pardon my 
 
38. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 63 (citing a letter from Martha L. Nelson to 
Governor Henry Wise seeking a pardon of her slave); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, 
JORDAN, ROLL 599 (1st ed. 1974). 
39. See, e.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE GREAT NEW YORK CONSPIRACY OF 1741: 
SLAVERY, CRIME, AND COLONIAL LAW 74–76 (2003). 
40. See, e.g., An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act of the General Assembly of 
This Province, Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other 
Slaves in This Province;” and for Continuing Such Part of the Said Act as Is Not Altered or 
Amended by This Present Act, for the Term Therein Mentioned, no. 790, § VII (1751), in 7 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 420, 422 (David J. McCord ed., Columbia, 
A.S. Johnston 1840) [hereinafter 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA]. 
41. See, e.g., GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 599; NORRECE T. JONES, JR., BORN A CHILD 
OF FREEDOM, YET A SLAVE 189–90 (1990). 
42. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 63 (citing a letter from Martha L. Nelson to 
Governor Henry Wise seeking a pardon of her slave).  Nelson’s request was unsuccessful.  See 
id. at 63 n.27. 
43. See id. at 63. 
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servant . . . such a servant ought not to be sent away particularly 
in these perilous times of insurrection.44 
In recognition of the concern for personal safety, legislatures—such 
as those in Georgia and South Carolina—enacted statutory provisions 
rewarding slaves who provided information regarding poisonings by 
slaves.  South Carolina’s 1751 Code provided a four-pound reward for 
information regarding the attempt to poison an owner that resulted in 
conviction.45  In the 1770 and 1848 Georgia Codes, a slave who informed 
about the poisoning of another received twenty shillings per year till 
death and on the day he received the reward was excused from work.46 
Every negro, mulatto, or mustizoe, who shall hereafter give 
information of the intention of any other slave to poison any 
person, or of any slave that hath furnished, procured or conveyed 
any poison to be administered to any person, shall, upon 
conviction of the offender or offenders, be entitled to and 
receive from the public of this province, a reward of twenty 
shillings, to be paid him or her by the treasurer yearly and every 
year, during the abode of such negro, mulatto, or mustizoe in this 
province, on the day that such discovery was made, and shall also 
be exempted from the labor of his or her master on that 
day . . . .47 
 
44. See id. (quoting a letter from Martha L. Nelson to Governor Henry Wise seeking a 
pardon of her slave). 
45. An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act of the General Assembly of This 
Province, Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves 
in This Province;” and for Continuing Such Part of the Said Act as Is Not Altered or 
Amended by This Present Act, for the Term Therein Mentioned, no. 790, § VIII (1751), in 7 
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 420, 423. 
46. Criminal Law, Persons of Color, and County Regulations, tit. 2, ch. 34, art. 1, § 2(19), 
in 4 A CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA 841 (William A. Hotchkiss ed., 
Augusta, Charles E. Grenville, 2d ed. 1848) [hereinafter STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA]; 
APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 143 (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within 
This Province, and for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by 
Such Slaves, and Other Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and 
Carrying Away Slaves from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, §§ 13–14 (1770), in 
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 430–31). 
47. Criminal Law, Persons of Color, and County Regulations, tit. 2, ch. 34, art. 1, § 2(19), 
in STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA, supra note 46, at 841; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 
143 (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within This Province, and for 
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from 
Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, § 14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 430–31). 
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White communities sought state-based rewards for slaves whose 
informing efforts protected the White community’s safety by preventing 
slave insurrection.  The following are descriptions from three legislative 
or judicial petitions filed by Whites seeking rewards for slave informing.  
First, a slave named Abram, owned by William Kirk, revealed an 
alleged plot by Blacks to “massacre” Whites in the community, thereby 
preventing the insurrection and resulting in punishment of those 
(allegedly) involved.48  For his efforts, ninety-two community members 
petitioned the South Carolina Senate to reward Abram for his “highly 
meritorious conduct,” “fidelity and services.”49  Additionally, if the 
Senate determined to emancipate Abrams, the petitioners asked that 
Kirk be compensated “handsome[ly]” for the loss of Abram’s labor.50 
Second, a slave named Henrietta overheard a slave named Charles 
conspiring to start an insurrection.51  Henrietta reported what she heard 
to her owner, Ann Paisley.  Charles was thus arrested, and upon being 
confronted with Henrietta’s information, he confessed, implicating other 
Blacks.52  Because of her informing, “[B]lacks were very generally 
excited” against Henrietta and one even attacked her, leading to his 
execution.53  Because of her “fealty” and need for protection, six 
members of the community petitioned the legislature to free Henrietta 
and her child, provide Paisley a stipend, and indemnify Paisley for the 
loss of Henrietta.54 
Third, a slave named Monday, several other slaves, and three White 
men, who were selling the slaves as part of an estate sale, were traveling 
in Georgia.55  Some of the slaves conspired to kill the White men and 
 
48. LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOHN MCCUMBEE ET AL. TO THE PRESIDENT AND 
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1803), microformed on Race, Slavery, and 
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 9, Frame 0019 
(Univ. Publ’ns of Am.). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOHN WILSON ET AL. TO THE PRESIDENT AND 
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1829), microformed on Race, Slavery, and 
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 10, Frame 0527 
(Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter JOHN WILSON ET AL. PETITION]. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Petition to the Court of Pleas for Wake County, North Carolina from Allen Rogers 
& Henry Moring, microformed on Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern 
County Courts, 1775–1867, at Series 2, Part D, Reel 1, Frame 0043, PAR 21200014 (Univ. 
Publ’ns of Am.). 
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any slave who would not join the conspiracy.56  Having armed 
themselves to carry out the plan, they awakened Monday to enlist his 
involvement.57  He refused to join, whereupon the conspirators tried to 
silence him.58  They were unsuccessful and Monday managed to run and 
tell of the plot, saving the White men’s lives.59  As a result, the 
petitioner—one of the saved men—asked the court to emancipate 
Monday.60 
Not only did Whites concern themselves with personal and 
communal safety, White slave owners worried about protecting and 
maximizing their financial interests, and slave informants were able to 
assist with this concern as well.  Slaves “stole” from their masters in 
three ways.  First, slaves would “steal” the owner’s personal property, 
including food and tools.61  Second, slaves would “steal” the owner’s 
rights to the slave’s physical labor or reproduction, by, for example, 
malingering, stalling, or preventing another from working to capacity.62  
Finally, at the extreme, slaves would “steal” themselves by running away 
or assisting other runaways.63  All of these behaviors by slaves resulted 
in the reduction of the owner’s financial interests.  To combat these 
financial losses, South Carolina rewarded those slaves who provided 
information regarding stolen goods: 
[A]ny negro or slave shall inform any justice of the peace of any 
stolen goods sold to any white person by any negro or slave, and 
if upon search, by virtue of a warrant from the said justice, the 
said goods shall be found and proved to be so stolen, the said 
negro or slave so informing, shall receive from the person 
offending, the sum of two pounds, over and above the penalty by 
law appointed.64 
 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 599. 
62. See id. at 620–21. 
63. See id. at 648, 653. 
64. An Additional Act to an Act Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and 
Governing Negroes and All Other Slaves,” no. 344, § VIII (1714), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 365, 367; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 25, at 
173 (citing An Additional Act to an Act Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and 
Governing Negroes and All Other Slaves,” no. 344, § VIII (1714), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 365, 367). 
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States also rewarded slaves for turning in a runaway.  For example, in 
South Carolina, a slave who informed on a runaway slave received 
money.65 
As an interesting aside, even without government sanction, owners 
sought informants to protect their personal financial interests.  An 
owner would want a slave to reveal an assault on another slave, which 
might reduce productivity.66  Similarly, owners were interested to know 
if a White overseer too harshly punished a slave, thereby preventing a 
slave from working.67  Also, if a White overseer had bad business 
acumen or committed crimes against the owner (such as theft), the 
owner might hope that a slave would provide such information.68 
Finally, the formal criminal justice process presented means for a 
slave owner to prevent other Whites from interfering with the owner’s 
interests.  In Harrington v. State, a slave owner used one of his slaves to 
detect another White community member’s illegal behavior concerning 
slaves.69  The slave owner orally gave permission to his slave to purchase 
alcohol from an individual the owner suspected of unlawfully selling 
alcohol to his slaves.70  The owner also gave his slave money to make the 
purchase.71  The transaction occurred and the defendant was charged 
with distributing alcohol to a slave without written owner permission.72  
In her defense, the defendant argued consent, i.e., that the owner had 
given permission for the sale.73  The court held that the defense was not 
available when the consent is: 
[A]n experiment to detect a violation of the law.  The master’s 
delivery of money to a slave, with instructions to buy liquor from 
 
65. An Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves, no. 57, § VI (1690), in 7 STATUTES AT 
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 343, 345 (stating that if a slave were to “take 
up any runaway, he or she shall have the whole benefit thereof”); An Act for the Better 
Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Slaves, no. 314, § XXVI (1712) in 7 STATUTES AT 
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 352, 362 (stating that any slave who 
delivered a runaway to the owner or master of the slave would receive twenty shillings from 
the owner or the marshal). 
66. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 625–27. 
67. See id. at 17–19.  Owners used slaves to inform on overseers with bad business 
acumen, inflicting overly harsh discipline, and committing crimes against the owner.  Id. 
68. See id. 
69. Harrington v. State, 36 Ala. 236, 239, 243 (1860). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 238. 
73. Id. at 243. 
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a person whom he suspects of having unlawfully sold liquor to 
slaves for the purpose of detecting the offender, does not excuse 
the sale of liquor to the slave for such money.74 
B. Mere Informants and Active Agents 
Evidence firmly reveals that owners received incriminating 
information from Blacks about other Blacks.75  Passive informants 
merely provided information that facilitated the detection, investigation, 
or punishment of misconduct.  Information also demonstrates, however, 
that some slaves went a step further and actively assisted in uncovering 
or rectifying slave misconduct. 
The passive provision of information was the bane of many a 
runaway slave.  Numerous examples of slaves revealing to owners the 
location of a runaway can be found.  Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, 
written by Harriet Jacobs using the pseudonym of Linda Brent, is “the 
most comprehensive slave narrative written by an Afro-American 
woman.”76  Over the many years she hid away, Jacobs’ owner attempted 
to find her.77  Desperate to locate her, he resorted to soliciting 
information from other Blacks as to her whereabouts.78  In her 
autobiography, Jacobs writes of one such instance: 
I [Harriet Jacobs] learned that the doctor had written to New 
York to a colored woman, who had been born and raised in our 
neighborhood, and had breathed his contaminating atmosphere.  
He offered her a reward if she could find out [anything] about 
me.  I know not what was the nature of her reply; but he soon 
after started for New York in haste, saying to his family that he 
had business of importance to transact.79 
Rebellions too were betrayed by the simple act of a slave telling 
many or few facts.  Well-known rebellions planned by Denmark Vesey 
and Gabriel Prosser were undone by slave informants and so too were 
 
74. Id. 
75. See JONES, supra note 41, at 127. 
76. See Jean Fagan Yellin, Harriet Ann Jacobs, c. 1813–1897, LEGACY, Fall 1988, at 55, 
55–58. 
77. HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (L. Maria Child 
ed., 1861), reprinted in EARLY AFRICAN-AMERICAN CLASSICS, supra note 19, at 111, 222–24. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 222. 
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many lesser-known, planned rebellions.80  Such revelations naturally led 
to the quashing of the plot before it even started.81 
In contrast to the passive informant whose work was done once 
information was conveyed, the active informant assisted an owner in 
detecting or remediating misbehavior.  Several scenarios exemplify 
various forms of active assistance, including acting as a guide, assisting 
in capture, and conducting undercover buys.  A slave named Royal 
represents the first: acting as a guide.  Royal’s story is as follows.  Joe 
was a notorious runaway slave who eluded capture and continued to 
hide out four years after murdering a White man.82  While on the run, 
Joe established a camp that could not be found by Whites, yet to which 
other slaves ran.83  Joe was reputed to have led his band of outlaws to 
commit much “mischief.”84  Community members were “in a constant 
state of uneasiness and alarm” and offered many rewards for Joe’s 
capture.85  The family of the slain White man offered a reward, as did the 
State.86  Receiving no other assistance from the State, however, the 
community established groups to search for Joe and the encampment, 
but they were unsuccessful.87  Enter Royal, who physically led a party of 
Whites to Joe’s camp and somehow convinced Joe and his followers to 
make themselves known.88  As a result, Joe and the other runaways were 
killed.89  For his efforts, community members petitioned the South 
Carolina Senate to reward Royal.90 
The story of a slave named Isaac, who allegedly suffered his demise 
at the hands of a slave named Jim, demonstrates another type of active 
informant: one who effectuates, or attempts to effectuate, the capture of 
a slave.  Allegedly, Jim killed Isaac based on a belief that Whites had 
 
80. See discussion infra at Part V. 
81. See, e.g., LERONE BENNETT JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK 
AMERICA 125–26, 130 (Penguin Books, 6th ed. 1993). 
82. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOHN MAGRANT JR. ET AL. TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1824), microformed on Race, 
Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 10, 
Frame 0244 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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hired Isaac to assist in Jim’s capture.91  The underlying facts are that Jim 
was to be sold to satisfy the debts of his owner, whose property had 
been attached.92  Jim ran, becoming one of two runaways who were 
being concealed by other slaves in the community.93  The two runaways 
learned that Isaac had been hired by Whites executing the attachment to 
find and betray the runaways.94  When Isaac was shot through a door at 
the home of a slave owner, Jim was believed to be the shooter.95  Jim 
was found the next morning and arrested for the crime.96 
Finally, a third type of active informant was the slave who was used 
by a White owner to make what would today be called an “undercover 
buy.”  Harrington v. State, discussed earlier, represents such an 
instance.97  In Harrington, a White slave owner provided one of his 
slaves with the motive and means to attempt what would be the 
unlawful purchase of alcohol.98  The slave was successful and the 
defendant was charged with distributing alcohol to a slave without 
written owner permission.99  Though the slave was not knowingly acting 
as an informant—or for that matter acting with wrongful intent—this 
case still reveals a type of active informant that Whites would use. 
III. MOTIVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE POTENTIAL 
INFORMANT 
Slaves had many considerations to muse over in deciding whether to 
inform.  In no particular order, this Part catalogs and exemplifies 
primary, though surely not all, concerns.  Sometimes the considerations 
 
91. See Jim v. State, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 145, 145–46 (1844). 
92. Id. 
93. See id. 
94. Id. at 146. 
95. See id. at 147. 
96. Id. at 147–48. 
97. See discussion supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
98. Harrington v. State, 36 Ala. 236, 239, 243 (1860). 
99. Id. at 238–39. The defendant argued consent, i.e., that the owner had given 
permission for the sale.  Id. at 243.  The court held that the defense was not available because 
the consent was: 
[A]n experiment to detect a violation of the law.  The master’s delivery of money to 
a slave, with instructions to buy liquor from a person whom he suspects of having 
unlawfully sold liquor to slaves for the purpose of detecting the offender, does not 
excuse the sale of liquor to the slave for such money. 
Id. 
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overlapped or required the balancing of interests, and not all factors 
necessarily applied to each individual or in a particular circumstance. 
Several motivations promoted informing, including loyalty to one’s 
owner, self-preservation, criminal leniency, freedom, the right to live 
free in a state, and money.  Additionally, when slaves needed White 
owners to police extreme misconduct by slaves that harmed other slaves, 
they might inform to spur action.100  Factors discouraging informing were 
preservation of others, slave community loyalty, resistance, and fear of 
backlash from other slaves.  A slave’s religious convictions either 
promoted or discouraged informing, depending on the particular slave 
or context. 
A. Owner Loyalty and Favor 
Discussions of snitching invariably raise questions of loyalty.101  To 
whom does the informant owe his loyalty?  Himself?  His community?  
Which community?  The state?  Whose loyalty is he betraying by 
informing?  Is that betrayal acceptable? 
Some slaves viewed their interests as aligned with their owners.102  
Thus, fidelity to their owners caused some of these slaves to inform.  For 
example, Scipio, the “body servant” of his owner, revealed a potential 
uprising in Camden, South Carolina, in 1816 in order to save his 
owner.103  Scipio was freed as a result of his efforts but continued to work 
for his master, although it is unclear whether he was paid for his work or 
unpaid.104  Scipio’s story raises the matter of whether domestic slaves 
were more likely to inform than other slaves because of their proximity 
to or relationship with their owners.  Either proximity or relationship 
might encourage owner loyalty.  Part VI addresses in detail the 
allegation against domestic slaves while this Part discusses the matter 
without regard to status. 
Jim, a slave, presents another example of the extent to which a slave 
would go to protect an owner’s interest.  Jim killed another slave who 
was attacking property Jim’s owner had entrusted to Jim.105  The same 
 
100. See infra Part III.C. 
101. See Rich, supra note 12, at 1518–23. 
102. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 62. 
103. JONES, supra note 41, at 190; Rory T. Cornish, Camden, South Carolina, Plot 
(1816), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SLAVE RESISTANCE AND REBELLION 97, 97–98 (Junius P. 
Rodriguez ed., 2007). 
104. JONES, supra note 41, at 190. 
105. Id. (citing LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM RICHARD JOHNSON TO THE SPEAKER 
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man owned both Jim and the victim.106  Jim was charged with murder.107  
His owner, Reverend Richard Johnson, petitioned the legislature for 
Jim’s release.108 
Akin to those who informed because of owner loyalty are those 
Blacks who did so because of a poor self-image and in an effort to earn 
White recognition and respect.109  Harriet Jacobs, as she hid from her 
owner in her grandmother’s attic, observed a free Black man who 
informed on other Blacks in order to curry favor: 
I was warned to keep extremely quiet, because two guests had 
been invited.  One was the town constable, and the other was a 
free colored man, who tried to pass himself off for white, and 
who was always ready to do any mean work for the sake of 
currying favor with white people.110 
Lew Cheney, a slave in Louisiana who organized a party of slaves to 
escape to Mexico, betrayed his group when he became “convinced of 
the ultimate failure of his project, in order to curry favor with his 
master.”111  Cheney was apparently successful, as he was eventually 
rewarded for his betrayal.112  Many suspected slaves from his group, on 
the other hand, were captured and hurriedly executed.113 
B. Communal Solidarity and Resistance 
If a slave viewed loyalty to the slave community as of prime 
importance, the slave might also take the position that refusing to 
inform evidenced and reinforced communal solidarity and resistance of 
 
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1838), microformed on 
Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, 
Reel 11, Frame 0231 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION]). 
106. JONES, supra note 41, at 190–91 (citing RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION, supra note 
105). 
107. JONES, supra note 41, at 191 (citing RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION, supra note 105). 
108. JONES, supra note 41, at 190–91 (citing RICHARD JOHNSON PETITION, supra note 
105); see also JONES, supra note 41, at 128 (documenting slaves’ concerns for the safety of 
their owners). 
109. See JACOBS, supra note 77, at 226 (describing a free Black “who tried to pass 
himself off for white” and would readily inform on other Blacks); JONES, supra note 41, at 
190. 
110. JACOBS, supra note 77, at 226. 
111. JULIUS LESTER, TO BE A SLAVE 118 (1968) (quoting SOLOMON NORTHUP, 
TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE 188–89 (Sue Eakin & Joseph Logsdon eds., Library S. Civilization 
1975) (1853)). 
112. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189). 
113. Id. (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189). 
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authority.  Professor Norrece T. Jones contends that historical sources in 
South Carolina overwhelmingly support the conclusion that slaves who 
helped runaways did so voluntarily and reveled in doing so.114  His 
position stands in stark contrast to Professor Eugene Genovese’s claim 
that “slaves often refused to betray organized runaways not because of a 
sense of solidarity but because of fear of ghastly reprisals.”115  Both are 
likely correct. 
In his narrative, Frederick Douglass opined that a slave who refused 
to inform was demonstrating fidelity to both the Black community and 
humanity at large.116  Douglass wrote: 
The slaveholders have been known to send in spies among their 
slaves, to ascertain their views and feelings in regard to their 
condition.  The frequency of this has had the effect to establish 
among the slaves the maxim, that a still tongue makes a wise 
head.  They suppress the truth rather than take the consequences 
of telling it, and in so doing prove themselves a part of the 
human family.117 
Further, Douglass relates a story he heard when he was a free man in 
the North.118  As he writes it, Douglass’s tone indicates pleasant surprise 
at the lengths to which escaped slaves would go to protect each other 
from being sold back into slavery.119 
I found the colored people much more spirited than I had 
supposed they would be.  I found among them a determination 
to protect each other from the blood-thirsty kidnapper, at all 
hazards.  Soon after my arrival, I was told of a circumstance 
which illustrated their spirit.  A colored man and a fugitive slave 
were on unfriendly terms.  The former was heard to threaten the 
latter with informing his master of his whereabouts.  
Straightaway a meeting was called among the colored people, 
under the stereotyped notice, “Business of importance!”  The 
betrayer was invited to attend.  The people came at the 
appointed hour, and organized the meeting by appointing a very 
religious old gentleman as president, who, I believe, made a 
 
114. JONES, supra note 41, at 168. 
115. See id. (quoting EUGENE D. GENOVESE, FROM REBELLION TO REVOLUTION: 
AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 77 (1979)). 
116. See DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 30. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. at 102–03. 
119. See id. 
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prayer, after which he addressed the meeting as follows: 
“Friends, we have got him here, and I would recommend that you 
young men just take him outside the door, and kill him!”  With 
this, a number of them bolted at him; but they were intercepted 
by some more timid than themselves, and the betrayer escaped 
their vengeance, and has not been seen in New Bedford since.  I 
believe there have been no more such threats, and should there 
be hereafter, I doubt not that death would be the consequence.120 
C. Communal Regulation 
While slaves may have refused to cooperate as a measure of 
communal solidarity and resistance, at times they found it necessary to 
inform in order to ensure the security of the community.  Most times, 
slaves internally controlled miscreants—so called “bad” men121—in 
order to protect each other and because slave owners ignored the 
negative behavior of slaves unless it affected owners’ property and 
financial interests.122  However, when internal communal strife reached a 
sufficient level that was beyond their ability to control, or desire to 
control, slaves turned to their White owners to regulate communal 
behavior.123  To initiate the involvement of an owner, a slave had to 
reveal the offending conduct.124 
What type of behavior or person merited this tactic?  Bully slaves 
who assaulted other slaves would be revealed.125  Those slaves who 
taught slave children immoral behavior, such as how to gamble, were 
subject to outing.126  A slave who shirked responsibilities, thus forcing 
others to do more work,127 and a slave whose behavior might cause an 
owner to exact penalty upon the entire community could be handed 
over to an owner.128  In all these instances, the bad slave would force the 
 
120. Id. 
121. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 625 (contrasting “ba-ad” men (respected and 
admired) and “bad” men (feared)). 
122. See id. at 625–27, 629. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. at 627. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 629. 
128. See id. (citing ORVILLE W. TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN ARKANSAS 108 (1959)) 
(describing a situation in which slaves turned in, rather than protected, a runaway who had 
killed an overseer). 
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normally silent slave into invoking White protection by telling on their 
caste mates.129 
D. Communal Ostracism and Retaliation 
Professor Eugene Genovese claimed that “slaves often refused to 
betray organized runaways . . . because of fear of ghastly reprisals.”130  
Plenty of evidence exists from a variety of sources that slaves who 
informed on other slaves were stigmatized by the slave community and 
faced violent physical retaliation.131  According to Professor Norrece T. 
Jones, all slaves knew that revealing slave misconduct, with limited 
exceptions, would be viewed as “sacrilegious and sinful.”132  Even Whites 
were aware of this viewpoint.133 
A justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court—obviously White—
confirmed both the nonviolent and violent repercussions in a case in 
which a slave informant—Isaac—was allegedly killed by another slave—
Jim.134  The Isaac-Jim saga was discussed earlier in the context of 
identifying active slave informants.135  In an opinion the justice wrote 
reviewing Jim’s conviction, he claimed: 
 The truth seems to be that Isaac had not only excited the 
enmity of George and Jim, but he seems to have lost caste with 
the other negroes in the neighborhood.  He had combined with 
the white folks to betray George to the sheriff, and it was 
thought he was also engaged to apprehend Jim.—This was no 
slight offence in their eyes: that one of their own color, subject to 
a like servitude, should abandon the interests of his caste, and, 
for hire, betray black folks to the white people, rendered him an 
object of general aversion.  Hence it was, that George and Jim 
felt so little hesitation in the utterance of their threats; and hence 
it was, that Cindy did not wish to destroy Jim for such a fellow.136 
Slave owners too were aware that slaves suspected of or found to be 
collaborating were subject to being ostracized, assaulted, or killed.  
Petitions formally filed on behalf of slaves by Whites hinted that slaves 
 
129. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 629. 
130. JONES, supra note 41, at 168 (quoting GENOVESE, supra note 115, at 77). 
131. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 41, at 118. 
132. Id. at 125. 
133. Id. 
134. See Jim v. State, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 145, 151 (1844). 
135. See discussion supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
136. Jim, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) at 151. 
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who informed on slaves faced or feared retaliation by Blacks.137  For 
these reasons, slave owners would protect the identities of their 
informants.138  For example, in Camden, South Carolina, in 1816, a slave 
revealed a conspiracy scheduled for July 4, 1816.139  Ultimately, the 
legislature freed the slave, paid the slave’s owner $1,100, and awarded 
the slave a life pension of $50.140  The slave asked his owner never to 
reveal the slave’s name because he did not want to have “to leave this 
country, and he knew the negroes would not let him live here.”141 
E. Religion 
In the early days of slavery, Whites did not expose slaves to religion 
for a variety of reasons, including the belief that slaves did not need 
religion and the fear that slaves would learn to read and write.142  
Eventually, Whites believed that slaves who learned religion would be 
more subservient and that religion could be a useful tool in maintaining 
the institution of slavery.143  White religious leaders strictly controlled 
Blacks’ access to religion and cultivated and enlisted Black religious 
leaders to assist in detecting and investigating slave misconduct.144 
Slaves who embraced a religious life told church authorities about 
formerly private matters handled within the slave community.145  Some 
religious slaves would reveal both moral crimes (e.g., adultery, theft) as 
well as political crimes (e.g., not working, being rebellious, running 
 
137. E.g., LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM LEWIS BOLAH TO THE SENATE AND THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINA (1824), microformed on 
Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, 
Reel 18, Frame 0450, PAR 11682404 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter LEWIS BOLAH 
PETITION]; JOHN WILSON ET AL. PETITION, supra note 51. 
138. JONES, supra note 41, at 118–19. 
139. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 257. 
140. Id. at 258 (citing An Act Making Appropriations for the Extra Session of the 
Legislature, in the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen; and for Other 
Purposes Therein Mentioned, no. 2132, § II, in 6 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 57, 58 (David J. McCord ed., Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1839) [hereinafter 6 
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA]). 
141. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 257 (quoting Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in 
Camden, S.C. to His Friend in Philadelphia, Dated July 4, 1816, N.Y. EVENING POST, July 18, 
1816, at 2). 
142. See JONES, supra note 41, at 131. 
143. See id. at 131–32. 
144. Id. at 143–44. 
145. Id. at 144–45. 
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away).146  For example, according to records of the Salem Presbyterian 
Church dated August 28, 1831: 
Cato Servant of John Shaw, was suspended for Six months for an 
assault made upon one of the Church members.  Jack servant of 
R. Witherspoon, was suspended for six months for charging the 
above named Cato with theft and Causing the assault.147 
Others, though religious, distinguished between moral and political 
crimes, with the latter not being subject to revelation.148  Interestingly, 
for those who refused to betray political crimes, religion also provided 
the justification.149  Some slaves believed it a deific decree not to reveal 
the whereabouts of runaways, among other “transgressions.”150 
F. Protection of Others 
Closely related to communal solidarity was the desire of a slave to 
protect another individual by not informing.  Again, Frederick 
Douglass’s autobiographical writings are informative.151  Before 
narrating how he escaped to freedom, Douglass set forth a caveat 
regarding his storytelling: 
I now come to that part of my life during which I planned, and 
finally succeeded in making, my escape from slavery.  But before 
narrating any of the peculiar circumstances, I deem it proper to 
make known my intention not to state all the facts connected 
with the transaction.  My reasons for pursuing this course may be 
understood from the following: First, were I to give a minute 
statement of all the facts, it is not only possible, but quite 
probable, that others would thereby be involved in the most 
embarrassing difficulties.  Secondly, such a statement would most 
undoubtedly induce greater vigilance on the part of the 
slaveholders than has existed heretofore among them; which 
would, of course, be the means of guarding a door whereby some 
dear brother bondsman might escape his galling chains.152 
 
146. See id. at 143, 145–46. 
147. Id. at 143 (quoting SALEM PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (BLAIR, S.C.) SESSION 
MINUTES AND REGISTERS, 1831–1946 (Aug. 28, 1831) (on file with Presbyterian Historical 
Society)). 
148. See JONES, supra note 41, at 146. 
149. See id. at 137. 
150. See id. 
151. See generally DOUGLASS, supra note 19. 
152. Id. at 92. 
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He later reiterated: 
But I remained firm, and, according to my resolution, on the 
third day of September, 1838, I left my chains, and succeeded in 
reaching New York without the slightest interruption of any 
kind.  How I did so,—what means I adopted,—what direction I 
travelled, and by what mode of conveyance,—I must leave 
unexplained, for the reasons before mentioned.153 
G. Self-Preservation 
When investigating alleged slave misconduct, a slave owner might 
have given a slave the choice between dying or providing information 
about another slave’s misconduct.154  Quite naturally, some chose to 
live.155  Along a similar vein, some slaves informed in order to prevent or 
stop Whites from torturing them.156  The fallout from Nat Turner’s 
rebellion provides such an instance.157  After learning of Nat Turner’s 
planned insurrection, Whites in Harriet Jacobs’ South Carolina town 
were in fear for their lives.158  So, they set about to squelch any such 
plans in their town by calling in poor, non-slaveholding Whites to search 
the houses of and torture free Blacks and slaves.159  Jacobs wrote 
regarding the impending torture: 
 
153. Id. at 97. 
154. See, e.g., HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN, OR, LIFE AMONG THE 
LOWLY 514–15 (David S. Reynolds ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (1852).  Simon Legree, the 
owner of Tom, the fictional protagonist in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, gave 
Tom such a choice: 
 “Well, Tom!” said Legree, . . . “do you know I’ve made up my mind to KILL 
you?” 
 “It’s very likely, mas’r,” said Tom, calmly. 
 “I have,” said Legree, with grim, terrible calmness, “done—just—that—thing, 
Tom, unless you’ll tell me what you know about these yer gals!” 
Id.  Tom refused to tell and was beaten to death.  Id.  Later passages reveal him to be 
motivated by loyalty to his fellow slaves, religious conviction, and an ethic of resisting his 
owner.  See id. at 516. 
155. JONES, supra note 41, at 127. 
156. See id. at 168, 179; see also Alfred L. Brophy, The Nat Turner Trials, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 1817, 1864–65 (2013) (describing the torture of a slave named Dave and others alleged 
to be plotting an insurrection in North Carolina, resulting in disclosures). 
157. See infra Part VII for a discussion of Nat Turner’s rebellion. 
158. See JACOBS, supra note 77, at 161. 
159. See id. at 161–62. 
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Poor creatures!  They thought it was going to be a holiday.  I was 
informed of the true state of affairs, and imparted it to the few I 
could trust.  Most gladly would I have proclaimed it to every 
slave; but I dared not.  All could not be relied on.  Mighty is the 
power of the torturing lash.160 
Respecting the choice between withstanding torture and informing, 
Jacobs further commented: 
One black man, who had not fortitude to endure scourging, 
promised to give information about the conspiracy.  But it turned 
out that he knew nothing at all.  He had not even heard the name 
of Nat Turner.  The poor fellow had, however, made up a story, 
which augmented his own sufferings and those of the colored 
people.161 
Self-protection also focused on avoiding responsibility for alleged 
misconduct.  Thus, a slave might inform in order to divert or deflect 
blame from himself.162  Lew Cheney, who earlier presented as a striking 
and unsympathetic exemplar of a slave seeking to curry favor with 
Whites,163 also presents here as a slave strongly motivated by his own 
interests.  Cheney, a Louisiana slave, organized a group of slaves to run 
away to Mexico.164  However, when he became “convinced of the 
ultimate failure of his project,”165 he sought to avoid the negative 
consequences that would naturally follow if it were learned that he 
organized the mass escape.166 
Departing secretly from the encampment, he proclaimed among 
the planters the number[s] collected in the swamp, and, instead 
of stating truly the object they had in view, asserted their 
intention was to emerge from their seclusion the first favorable 
opportunity, and murder every white person along the bayou.167 
 
160. Id. at 161. 
161. Id. at 165. 
162. See JONES, supra note 41, at 128. 
163. See NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 188–89; see also discussion supra Part III.A. 
164. See LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 188). 
165. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (quoting NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189). 
166. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189). 
167. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (alteration in original) (quoting NORTHUP, supra 
note 111, at 189). 
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Cheney was rewarded while his campmates were captured and 
executed.168 
The Negro Plot Trials of 1741 tell the story of northern slaves who 
informed—sometimes falsely—to deflect criminal attention, as Whites 
were vigorously investigating and prosecuting slaves for a perceived 
insurrection.169  In 1741, a series of fires started throughout New York 
City.170  Whites began to believe that slaves—and possibly some 
Whites—were starting the fires.171  Hysteria reigned and Whites targeted 
Blacks to round up and arrest.172  A grand jury was impaneled to 
investigate.173  Trials lacking due process—though granting more process 
than normally accorded slaves—were quickly held, resulting in many 
convictions and executions.174 
In the course of investigating and adjudicating the fires and alleged 
conspiracy, monetary rewards and pardons were offered to Whites and 
Blacks for information: a free person could receive £100 for information; 
a free Black could receive £45 and be pardoned; and a slave could be 
freed, receive £20, and be pardoned while his master could receive 
£25.175  Additionally, slaves who came under suspicion informed to 
protect themselves from harsh punishment by diverting attention to 
other slaves.176  For example, Sandy—the first slave to confess to the 
grand jury—was able to save his life through informing.177  Quaco and 
Cuffee, however, who were both convicted after trial, were still executed 
after confessing at the last moment.178  Today, scholars debate whether 
 
168. LESTER, supra note 111, at 118 (citing NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 189). 
169. See generally HOFFER, supra note 39. 
170. Id. at 71–73. 
171. Id. at 2, 73–74. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 74–80. 
174. See id. at 81–129. 
175. Id. at 75 (citing Minutes of the Common Council of New York, April 11, 1741, in 5 
MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF  NEW YORK 1675–1776, at 17 (1905)). 
176. HOFFER, supra note 39, at 125–28.  Whites too were frequent informers.  Id. at 76–
77, 82.  Whites, particularly White servants, informed on Blacks and other Whites; some 
received freedom and compensation (e.g., Mary Burton—a White servant, and the first grand 
jury witness).  Id. at 82, 166; MAT JOHNSON, THE GREAT NEGRO PLOT: A TALE OF 
CONSPIRACY AND MURDER IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 99–100 (2007). 
177. HOFFER, supra note 39, at 88–89, 91, 116. 
178. Id. at 102–03.  Quaco and Cuffee, convicted and sentenced to death by immolation, 
confessed at the last hour but were still executed.  Id.  Confessions by slaves were admissible 
in criminal cases of slaves, though confessions by slaves to law enforcement or corrections 
officers were given little weight because the slave’s “habit of obedience . . . compels him to 
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there was an actual concerted plot by slaves, a hoax, or something in 
between.179  Nonetheless, the available evidence confirms that slaves 
were motivated by self-preservation to inform on other slaves. 
H. Criminal Leniency 
Slaves who were involved in unlawful conspiracies obtained 
sentencing leniency, such as the avoidance of execution, by testifying 
against other slaves.180  For example, a slave named John was convicted 
of conspiracy and attempted insurrection after he confessed and pled 
guilty.181  Having testified against other slaves, he was sentenced to be 
sold out of the United States rather than executed, which was the usual 
punishment for his crime.182  In another instance, a slave named Paul, 
also known as Figaro, was involved in an insurrection plot in 
Charleston.183  He testified against other slaves who were convicted and 
executed.184  Paul’s sentence, however, was reduced from execution to 
sale out of the country.185  Similarly, Moses, one of the early participants 
 
answer all questions of the idlest curiosity, while his mendacious disposition will always 
involve even the most innocent in the most contradictory inconsistencies.”  The Law of Negro 
Slavery, ch. 18, § 315, in 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 3, 271 (Thomas R. R. Cobb ed., Phila., T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1858) 
[hereinafter LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY].  Confessions by slaves to their masters were 
inadmissible in criminal cases against slaves because “slave[s] [were] always ready to 
mould . . . answers so as to please the master, and . . . no confidence [could] be placed in the 
truth of his statements.”  The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 18, § 317, in LAW OF NEGRO 
SLAVERY, supra, at 3, 272. 
179. See HOFFER, supra note 39, at 1–9. 
180. Unquestionably and uniformly, slaves were incompetent to be witnesses in cases for 
or against free Whites.  The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 13, §§ 247, 253, in LAW OF NEGRO 
SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 226, 230.  Exclusion was justified on the grounds that slaves 
were “servile” and “mendacious.”  The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 13, §§ 247, 256, in LAW OF 
NEGRO SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 226, 233.  In cases involving only slaves or free 
Blacks, slaves were permitted to serve as witnesses.  The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 13, § 253, 
in LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 230. 
181. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JOSEPH ENSLOW TO THE PRESIDENT AND 
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1831), microformed on Race, Slavery, and 
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 11, Frame 0007 
(Univ. Publ’ns of Am.). 
182. See id.  He died while imprisoned awaiting sale.  Id.  His owner sought 
compensation from the State.  Id. 
183. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM JAMES DELAIRE TO PRESIDENT JOHN WARD 
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1798), microformed on Race, 
Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 8, 
Frame 0482 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.). 
184. Id. 
185. Id.  While awaiting sale, his toes on one of his feet rotted and his foot fell off.  Id.  
 
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 52 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 52 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
DENNIS-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2014  4:38 PM 
310 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
in the Nat Turner rebellion in Southampton, Virginia, was caught and 
charged with murder and conspiracy.186  He, however, provided 
important testimony against other slaves.187  Though he was convicted 
and sentenced to death in spite of his cooperation, the court 
“recommended that the governor commute his sentence to 
transportation out[] of the state.”188  Finally, a Louisiana court expressly 
held that a jury had the discretion to commute a capital sentence, 
presumably for informing, if it so desired.189 
I. Manumission 
The prospect of manumission was a strong motivator for 
informing.190  In the early years of slavery, owners could free slaves by 
will as a private matter.191  Over time, legislatures began to publicly 
regulate manumission: freeing slaves became illegal except with 
government approval, whether executive or legislative.192 
Only the most helpful of informants were eligible for manumission.  
In Louisiana as of 1831, with legislative approval, an owner could 
emancipate a slave “for long, faithful or important services rendered to 
 
His owner, James Delaire, petitioned for compensation due to the reduced sale value of Paul.  
Id. 
186. See infra Part VII for a description of the Turner rebellion.  For more discussion 
regarding Moses, see Brophy supra note 156 at 1825 & n.45 (citing EXTRACT FROM THE 
COURT RECORDS OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA (1831), reprinted in HENRY 
IRVING TRAGLE, THE SOUTHAMPTON SLAVE REVOLT OF 1831: A COMPILATION OF 
SOURCE MATERIAL 177, 185–86, 200–01, 220–21 (1971)). 
187. Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 n.45 (citing EXTRACT FROM THE COURT 
RECORDS OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA, supra note 186, at 185–86, 200–01, 220–
21). 
188. Brophy, supra note 156 at 1825 n.45 (citing EXTRACT FROM THE COURT RECORDS 
OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA supra note 186, at 221). 
189. See State v. Slave Jack, 14 La. Ann. 385, 386 (1859) (holding that a jury has 
discretion to commute a capital sentence).  In this case, the jury commuted the sentence, but 
did not reveal the grounds for doing so, suggesting that informing could possibly have been 
the reason.  See id. at 385. 
190. JONES, supra note 41, at 127. 
191. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 219 (2d ed. 1985) 
(identifying Virginia and Maryland as allowing private manumission). 
192. E.g., An Act to Restrain the Emancipation of Slaves, and to Prevent Free Persons 
of Color from Entering into This State; and for Other Purposes, no. 2236, § I (1820), in 7 
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 459 (providing that 
emancipation may only occur by legislative act); An Act to Determine the Mode of 
Emancipating Slaves Who Have Not Attained the Age Required by the Civil Code for Their 
Emancipation (1827), in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 59–60. 
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himself or family.”193  Similarly, the Louisiana Code provided in 1851 
that governors could free, as well as pardon or commute the sentences 
of, slave informants.194  The Virginia legislature permitted freedom for 
“meritorious services, to be judged of by the Governor and Council.”195  
Revelation of a slave conspiracy constituted “[m]eritorious services.”196 
In South Carolina, a slave could be emancipated if the slave, “in 
actual invasion, kill[s] or take[s] one or more of our enemies, and the 
same shall prove, by any white person, to be done by him, shall, for his 
reward, at the charge of the public, have and enjoy his freedom, for such 
his taking or killing, as aforesaid.”197  Finally, in North Carolina, 
emancipation could be sought for informants who revealed the 
whereabouts of runaways.198  Toney, a slave owned by Samuel White, 
 
193. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Prevent Free Persons of Colour 
from Entering into This State and for Other Purposes,” § 2 (1831), in 2 STATUTES ON 
SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 73. 
194. See McDowell v. Couch, 6 La. Ann. 365, 370 (1851) (citing An Act to Amend an 
Act Entitled “An Act Supplementary to an Act for the Punishment of Crimes and 
Misdemeanors,” and Other Supplementary Acts, Passed on the Twentieth March, Eighteen 
Hundred and Eighteen, Crimes and Misdemeanors, no. 18, § 1 (1823), in 1 A GENERAL 
DIGEST OF THE ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF LOUISIANA: PASSED FROM THE YEAR 1804, 
TO 1827, INCLUSIVE, AND IN FORCE AT THIS LAST PERIOD, WITH AN APPENDIX AND 
GENERAL INDEX 403 (L. Moreau Lislet ed., New Orleans, Banjamin Levy 1828) [hereinafter 
DIGEST OF LOUISIANA]).  Upon petition, the Governor or Senate had authority to commute 
a slave’s death sentence to life in prison “whenever the circumstances of the case are such as 
to entitle the offender to such commutation.”  McDowell, 6 La. Ann. at 370 (quoting An Act 
to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act Supplementary to an Act for the Punishment of Crimes 
and Misdemeanors,” and Other Supplementary Acts, Passed on the Twentieth March, 
Eighteen Hundred and Eighteen, Crimes and Misdemeanors, no. 18, § 1 (1823), in DIGEST OF 
LOUISIANA, supra, at 403).  Presumably, such “circumstances” would include informing. 
195. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and 
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 53 (1819), in 1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA: 
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF A PUBLIC AND 
PERMANENT NATURE, AS NOW ARE IN FORCE; WITH A GENERAL INDEX 421, 433–34 & n.* 
(Richmond, Thomas Ritchie 1819) [hereinafter CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA] (stating 
that in 1723, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute preventing emancipation by will; the 
statute continued in force until 1748). 
196. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and 
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 53 (1819), in CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at 
433–34 & n.*; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 25, at 48. 
197. An Act for Enlisting Such Trusty Slaves as Shall Be Thought Serviceable to This 
Province in Time of Alarms, no. 278, § V (1708), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 349, 350. 
198. E.g., Petition to the County Court of Quarter Sessions for the County of 
Pasquotank, North Carolina from J. Banks et al. (1972), microformed on Race, Slavery, and 
Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1775–1867, at Series 2, Part D, Reel 1, Frame 
0138, PAR 21279202 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.). 
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learned of a plan by slaves and the owner of a ship to convey the slaves 
North.199  Toney revealed the plan and some of the slaves were 
thwarted.200  To reward his revelation, a group of sixteen White 
community members petitioned the court to free Toney.201 
J. Remaining in State 
A desirable reward closely connected to emancipation was the 
ability of an ex-slave to remain in state near one’s family and home.  
Thus, legislatures also sanctioned this reward for informing.  In Virginia, 
after May 1, 1806, any slave “emancipated for ‘an act, or acts of’ 
extraordinary merit” could apply to remain in state.202  On the other 
hand, a slave emancipated by will was required to leave state within 
twelve months.203 
Lewis Bolah represents an example in which a slave informant, who 
had been emancipated for revealing a rebellion, petitioned to remain in 
state after emancipation.  While he could not have independently sought 
his emancipation, as a free man he could ask to remain in state.204  In 
1812, Bolah revealed an insurrection plot among slaves, free people of 
color, and “a few abandoned and lawless White persons” in New 
Orleans.205  In 1813, the governor of Louisiana granted Bolah, and 
others, freedom.206  Fearing for his safety in New Orleans, he sought to 
leave Louisiana.207  He petitioned the Virginia House to allow him to 
reside in Richmond, near where he had lived before he was sold down 
south to New Orleans.208 
 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and 
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 62 (1819), in CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at 
436. 
203. An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and 
Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 61 (1819), in CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at 
436.  Slave could be emancipated by will.  An Act Reducing into One, the Several Acts 
Concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and Mulattoes, no. C.111, § 53 (1819), in CODE OF THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 195, at 433–34. 
204. LEWIS BOLAH PETITION, supra note 137. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
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Similarly, a former slave emancipated by self-purchase could 
petition to remain in state.  Moses, a slave, purchased his freedom.209  He 
petitioned the court to allow him to remain in the state but the petition 
was denied for lack of “extraordinary merit.”210  In this petition, he had 
avowed that he had served his mistress well, was of good character, had 
saved his mistress from a house fire, and was “always . . . watchful to 
detect and desirous to suppress those mischiefs and vices in slaves and 
free Persons of Colour.”211  Apparently this was an insufficient basis to 
remain in the state.  He successfully re-petitioned, avowing: 
In times when there were frequent alarms of insurrections of the 
Blacks, when in the neighborhood, where [their] number was 
great being near large estates and extensive coal mines your 
Petitioner has more than once secretly made known to his 
Mistress the whispers of such plots being agitated and concerning 
them [h]e was always distressed and anxious to make 
discoveries.212 
K. Monetary Reward 
Surprisingly, monetary rewards to slave informants—either in 
conjunction with or distinct from emancipation—were available.213  
Blacks as a class were prevented by law from both personal freedom and 
 
209. LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM MOSES TO THE LEGISLATURE OF VIRGINIA (1822), 
microformed on Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–
1867, at Series 1, Reel 18, Frame 0349, PAR 11682205 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter 
MOSES PETITION]. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id.; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 273 n.26 (“In times when there were 
frequent alarms of insurrections of the Blacks, in the neighborhood, where [their] . . . number 
was great being near large estates and extensive coal mines your Petitioner has more than 
once secretly made known to his Mistress the whispers of such Plots being agitated and 
concerning them he was always distressed and anxious to make discoveries.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting MOSES PETITION, supra note 209)). 
213. See, e.g., APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 143 (citing An Act for Ordering and 
Governing Slaves within This Province, and for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of 
Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent 
the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, 
§§ 13–14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 
430–31); HOFFER, supra note 39, at 75 (citing Minutes of the Common Council of New York, 
April 11, 1741, in 5 MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF  NEW YORK 1675–
1776, at 17 (1905)).  These rewards were not part of the system of rewards available to Whites 
who acted as “informers” or private prosecutors.  See discussion supra notes 35–36 and 
accompanying text. 
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possession of property, thereby ensuring and fortifying their complete 
marginalization.214  The permissibility of a monetary reward for 
informing thus reveals the lengths to which Whites were willing to go in 
order to obtain highly valuable information.  Monetary rewards could 
also serve as a strong motivator to slaves.215 
As with manumission, a slave entitled to a monetary reward had to 
have performed exceptional acts.216  Slaves who betrayed insurrections 
received monetary rewards.217  In 1822, the South Carolina legislature 
emancipated Peter Desverneys, a slave who revealed the Denmark 
Vesey insurrection plot.218  In addition to his freedom, Desverneys was 
awarded $50 per year.219  In 1857, he petitioned the legislature for an 
increase in his annuity due to old age and poor health.220  He was 
supported by multiple members of the community.221 
Slaves who assisted slaveholders in capturing runaways received 
monetary rewards.222  Recall that Georgia and South Carolina provided 
monetary rewards to slaves revealing poisonings,223 and South Carolina 
also did so for slaves disclosing stolen property.224 
 
214. See The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 14, § 258, in LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY, supra 
note 178, at 3, 235.  Slaves were legally prevented from owning property.  Id.  A slave’s person 
and his time were the property of his master; thus, any earnings or property resulting from his 
labor became the property of his master.  The Law of Negro Slavery, ch. 14, §§ 258, 261, in 
LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY, supra note 178, at 3, 235, 237. 
215. See JONES, supra note 41, at 127. 
216. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Slaves, no. 
314, § XXVI (1712), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 352, 
362. 
217. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 41, at 179. 
218. See LEGISLATIVE PETITION FROM PETER DESVERNEYS TO THE STATE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SITTING IN GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY (1857), microformed on Race, Slavery, and Free Blacks: Petitions to Southern 
Legislatures, 1777–1867, at Series 1, Reel 11, Frame 0617 (Univ. Publ’ns of Am.) [hereinafter 
PETER DESVERNEYS PETITION]; see also discussion infra Part V. 
219. PETER DESVERNEYS PETITION, supra note 218. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. (indicating that this request was apparently granted and his annuity was raised 
to $150 per year). 
222. JONES, supra note 41, at 168. 
223. An Additional and Explanatory Act to an Act of the General Assembly of This 
Province, Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves 
in This Province;” and for Continuing Such Part of the Said Act as Is Not Altered or 
Amended by This Present Act, for the Term Therein Mentioned, no. 790, § VIII (1751), in 7 
STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 420, 423; APTHEKER, supra 
note 37, at 143 (citing An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves within This Province, and 
for Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
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Outside the government-backed system of monetary rewards, slave 
owners offered money for assistance.  For example, recall that Harriet 
Jacobs’ owner offered money to a colored woman living in New York in 
exchange for information about Harriet’s whereabouts.225  Jacobs’ owner 
suspected Jacobs was living in New York, although she was hiding right 
under his nose.226  The offer was apparently unsuccessful—either for the 
woman’s unwillingness to inform or lack of information—as Harriet 
continued in hiding for many years thereafter.227  Henry Bibb, however, 
was not so lucky.228  In July 1839, Bibb, a fugitive slave, returned to 
Kentucky, where his mother, wife, and child lived.229  He intended to 
free his wife and child.230  When he arrived, he called on his mother at 
her house.231  “[A] little slave girl” was in the house with his mother 
when he entered.232  The girl acted as if she were asleep, and listened to 
the whole conversation, which she then reported.233  Bibb laid low for a 
while, hoping that his owner would believe the slave girl was lying.234  It 
almost worked, until he was betrayed by a “new” friend, who was a 
slave, “for the sum of five dollars,” which had been offered by Bibb’s 
owner.235 
A variety of motivations underlay Blacks’ decisions to inform during 
slavery.  Some of the drivers were rooted in loyalty—whether to one’s 
owner, the Black community, self, or another slave.  Other 
considerations constituted rewards such as criminal leniency, money, 
 
Persons Therein Mentioned, and to Prevent the Inveighling, and Carrying Away Slaves from 
Their Masters, Owners, or Employers, §§ 13–14 (1770), in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 37, at 426, 430–31) (stating that a Georgia informer received 
twenty shillings per year till death and was excused from work on the day he received the 
reward). 
224. An Additional Act to an Act Entitled “An Act for the Better Ordering and 
Governing Negroes and All Other Slaves,” no. 344, § VIII (1714), in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 40, at 365, 367. 
225. JACOBS, supra note 77, at 222. 
226. Id. 
227. See generally JACOBS, supra note 77. 
228. Compare id. at 222, with HENRY BIBB, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE AND 
ADVENTURES OF HENRY BIBB: AN AMERICAN SLAVE 85–86 (Charles J. Hegler ed., Univ. of 
Wis. Press 2001) (1849). 
229. BIBB, supra note 228, at 84–86. 
230. Id. at 86–87. 
231. Id. at 84. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 84–85. 
234. See id. at 86. 
235. Id. 
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freedom, and continued in-state residency.  Finally, avoidance of 
community intimidation, religious belief, and indigenous communal 
regulation might be factors. 
IV. A CODE OF SILENCE 
Conclusively determining whether Blacks—individually or 
collectively—adhered to a code of silence is problematic for it is 
generally difficult to prove a negative.  Nonetheless, comparison of 
information from sources with different interests affords the opportunity 
to consider the possibility.236  Additionally, data may be gleaned from 
evidence of coping mechanisms adopted by Blacks in response to 
slavery.237 
Both slaveholders and slaves provide proof that Blacks kept their 
tongues silent regarding the misdeeds of other Blacks.  Historian 
Eugene Genovese noted that owners of slaves perceived slaves to be 
unwilling to betray each other.238  For example, Reverend C.C. Jones 
opined: 
[T]he Negroes are scrupulous on one point[,] they make common 
cause, as servants, in concealing their faults from their owners.  
Inquiry elicits no information; no one feels at liberty to disclose 
the transgressor; all are profoundly ignorant; the matter assumes 
the sacredness of a “professional secret.”239 
C.W. Gooch suggested that “no greater crime existed for the slaves 
than that of betraying one another to the whites.”240  Similarly, 
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook stated: “Between slaves on the same 
plantation there is a deep sympathy of feeling which binds them so 
closely together that a crime committed by one of their number is 
seldom discovered through their instrumentality.”241 
 
236. See DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 92; GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 622; Josiah 
Henson, The Life of Josiah Henson, Formerly a Slave, Now an Inhabitant of Canada (1849), in 
1 I WAS BORN A SLAVE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES 719, 746 (Yuval 
Taylor ed., 1999); JONES, supra note 41, at 167–70. 
237. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 437. 
238. Id. at 622. 
239. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CHARLES C. JONES, THE RELIGIOUS 
INSTRUCTION OF THE NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES 130 (Savannah, Thomas Purse 
1842)). 
240. See GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 622 (citing C.W. Gooch, Prize Essay on 
Agriculture in Virginia, 1 FARMERS’ REG. 121, 124 (1833)). 
241. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 622 (quoting WHITEMARSH B. SEABROOK, AN 
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More narrowly, with respect to the troubling and costly problem of 
runaways, slaveholders were acutely aware that runaways could not 
have been successful without the help of other slaves on the plantation 
and elsewhere.242  Help consisted not simply of refusing to reveal the 
existence of a runaway, but seemingly also of killing and burying 
tracking dogs, and providing food, shelter, and weapons.243 
The individual stories of runaway slaves confirm the ethic of silence 
that troubled slaveholders.  In his narrative, Josiah Henson, an escaped 
slave, recalled receiving the assistance of a slave who expected that 
Henson would never reveal the assistance: 
It was a dark, moonless night, and we got into the little skiff in 
which I had induced a fellow-slave to take us across the river.  It 
was an agitating and solemn moment.  The good fellow who was 
rowing us over, said this affair might end in his death; “but,” said 
he, “you will not be brought back alive, will you?”  “Not if I can 
help it,” I answered.  “And if you are overpowered and return,” 
he asked, “will you conceal my part of the business?”  “That I 
will, so help me God,” I replied.  “Then I am easy,” he answered, 
“and wish you success.”244 
Similarly, Frederick Douglass, when writing his narrative, revealed 
an unwillingness to disclose the names of those who helped him as he 
escaped to the North.245 
I now come to that part of my life during which I planned, and 
finally succeeded in making, my escape from slavery.  But before 
narrating any of the peculiar circumstances, I deem it proper to 
make known my intention not to state all the facts connected 
with the transaction.  My reasons for pursuing this course may be 
understood from the following: First, were I to give a minute 
statement of all the facts, it is not only possible, but quite 
probable, that others would thereby be involved in the most 
embarrassing difficulties.  Secondly, such a statement would most 
undoubtedly induce greater vigilance on the part of slaveholders 
than has existed heretofore among them; which would, of course, 
 
ESSAY ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SLAVES, AND ESPECIALLY, ON THEIR RELIGIOUS 
INSTRUCTION 12 (Charleston, A.E. Miller 1834)). 
242. JONES, supra note 41, at 167, 170. 
243. Id. at 167–68. 
244. Henson, supra note 236, at 746. 
245. DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 92. 
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be the means of guarding a door whereby some dear brother 
bondman might escape his galling chains.246 
He further wrote regarding his escape story: 
But I remained firm, and, according to my resolution, on the 
third day of September, 1838, I left my chains, and succeeded in 
reaching New York without the slightest interruption of any 
kind.  How I did so,—what means I adopted,—what direction I 
travelled, and by what mode of conveyance,—I must leave 
unexplained, for the reasons before mentioned.247 
Additionally, the Underground Railroad stands as unquestionable 
proof of an ability and a willingness of slaves to maintain silence 
regarding runaways.248  The number of slaves successfully escaping via 
the Underground Railroad is unknown; however, the number of 
successful escapees is undoubtedly small in proportion to the number of 
slaves.249  Nevertheless, the fact of its existence—which is 
unquestionable—as well as its efficacy and lasting nature presents strong 
evidence of a slave code of silence.  Without Blacks keeping the secrets 
of those attempting escape, success would have been highly unlikely for 
any escapee. 
Evidence suggests that not only did Blacks withhold information 
regarding runaway slaves, they also were unwilling to disclose more 
mundane forms of misconduct.  Douglass wrote: “The slaveholders have 
been known to send in spies among their slaves, to ascertain their views 
and feelings in regard to their condition.  The frequency of this has had 
the effect to establish among the slaves the maxim, that a still tongue 
makes a wise head.”250 
Finally, while refusal to divulge information to Whites was 
apparently desirable behavior among some slaves, sometimes it was 
necessary to surreptitiously communicate about impermissible subjects 
in front of Whites and potential informants.  Thus, slaves developed a 
system of coded language to prevent outsiders and informants from 
 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 97. 
248. See James A. Delle & Jason Shellenhamer, Archaeology at the Parvin Homestead: 
Searching for the Material Legacy of the Underground Railroad, HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY, no. 2, 
2008 at 38, 39–40. 
249. See id. 
250. DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 30. 
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understanding their conversations.251  As explained by Professor Eugene 
Genovese, slaves—in particular field slaves—developed a language and 
style of speaking all their own.252  Not only did their language allow 
slaves from different African cultures to communicate, but it prevented 
outsiders from understanding what was being said.  Thus, slaves, 
particularly field slaves, were able “to communicate with each other in 
the presence of whites with some measure of safety,” which “helped 
immeasurably to prevent informers from having too much to convey to 
the masters beyond impressions and suspicions.”253 
Available evidence makes clear that some Blacks held a personal 
ethic against providing incriminating information about other Blacks to 
Whites.  Additionally, there is support for the proposition that Blacks 
on the whole adhered to a code of silence.  Nonetheless, without more 
information, drawing a definite conclusion as to the existence of a 
communal ethic of silence is premature. 
V. THE ULTIMATE BETRAYAL 
Black informers during slavery revealed all manner of Black 
misconduct,254 including assaults, rivalries, sexual infidelities, and theft.255  
As the discussion in Part III evidences, such revelations might spur 
ostracism if not actual retaliation.  However, a Black person’s 
willingness to disclose a plan of rebellion or the location of a runaway 
might be characterized as the ultimate form of betrayal whether viewed 
from the perspective of the enslaved or their owners. 
Given the complete legal and social oppression of the enslaved, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that freedom and liberty—or the possibilities 
thereof—were extremely valued by slaves.  Two potential means of 
successfully achieving these states were rebellion and escape.  
Consequently, it stands to reason that a Black person who revealed a 
slave insurrection or the whereabouts of a runaway might become 
greatly reviled, unless arguably the revelation was made with good 
cause, such as because of torture. 
Slave owners and Whites too placed high value on the willingness of 
Blacks to inform on rebels and, to a slightly smaller extent, runaways.  
 
251. GENOVESE, supra note 38, at 437. 
252. Id. at 431–41. 
253. See id. at 437. 
254. JONES, supra note 41, at 127. 
255. See id. at 145, 189. 
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Evidence of such high value can be found in the granting of freedom to 
some slaves who revealed insurrections.256  A slave who demonstrated 
loyalty to Whites and protected their interests garnered the greatest 
reward. 
Notwithstanding that divulgences of the plans of rebels or runaways 
might merit extreme contempt from Blacks, such betrayals are well-
documented.  Researchers have substantiated numerous instances in 
which planned rebellions were betrayed beforehand by slaves.257  Indeed, 
Professor Norrece Jones notes that many slaves believed rebellions were 
always betrayed beforehand.258  Two well-known rebellions that were 
betrayed before they got underway include the Gabriel Prosser 
rebellion in Richmond, Virginia, in 1800 and the Denmark Vesey 
rebellion in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1822.259 
During the spring and summer of 1800, Prosser planned his 
rebellion.260  By August, several thousand slaves had been enlisted.261  On 
the day it was to begin, August 30, two slaves, Tom and Pharaoh,262 
betrayed the plot to their master who in turn told authorities.263  The 
governor called out the militia.264  Prosser did not know of the betrayal 
and that night approximately 1,000 slaves gathered.265  A thunderstorm 
prevented them from attacking when the storm washed out points of 
entry into the city.266  So, Prosser postponed the attack.267  He fled by 
boat but was located in Norfolk, Virginia, on September 25, 1800, by 
“two Negroes” who ultimately betrayed him.268  Prosser and many co-
conspirators were arrested before they could re-assemble to carry out 
the insurrection.269 
 
256. See discussion supra Part III.I. 
257. See, e.g., APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 170, 173–74, 189, 222; JONES, supra note 41, 
at 179. 
258. JONES, supra note 41, at 191 (citing THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON, ARMY 
LIFE IN A BLACK REGIMENT 248 (Boston, Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870)). 
259. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 125–31. 
260. Id. at 125. 
261. Id. at 126. 
262. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 221. 
263. Id.; BENNETT, supra note 81, at 126. 
264. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 126. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 222. 
269. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 126. 
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Denmark Vesey sought to strike Charleston, South Carolina, in 
1822.270  Peter Poyas was Vesey’s second-in-command.271  Poyas 
identified house slaves as the most likely of betrayers.272  “He told one of 
his recruiting agents to ‘take care and don’t mention it to those waiting 
men who receive presents of old coats, etc., from their masters, or they’ll 
betray us: I will speak to them.’”273  Notwithstanding Poyas’ command, 
some slaves ignored his instruction because they knew of house slaves 
“willing to poison their masters’ wells.”274  The attack was planned for 
July 16, 1822.275  An estimated 9,000 slaves had been enlisted.276 
Authorities detected the plan in the last week of May when a slave 
named William Paul tried to recruit Peter Devaney, a house slave.277  
Devaney betrayed the group by consulting a free Black named William 
Pencil who advised Devaney to tell his master, which he did.278  
However, Devaney was only able to give authorities a barebones plan.279  
Recruits knew only the name of their assigned leader and general 
plans.280  Only leaders of the plot knew details, in order to prevent the 
arrest or betrayal of one person from resulting in the collapse of the 
entire plan.281 
For two weeks, Vesey continued to plan and the government 
authorities investigated.282  Vesey moved up the date of attack.283  On the 
Friday before the new scheduled day, the group was betrayed again, this 
time by a slave who knew plans and some names.284  George Wilson, 
another slave and leader in the African Church, also provided 
information.285 
 
270. Id. at 127–31. 
271. Id. at 128. 
272. Id. at 129. 
273. Id.; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 270–71. 
274. JONES, supra note 41, at 178; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 270–71. 
275. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 130. 
276. See id. at 129. 
277. Id. at 130; JONES, supra note 41, at 179. 
278. JONES, supra note 41, at 179; see also APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 271 (spelling the 
free Black’s name as “Pencell”). 
279. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 130. 
280. Id. at 129. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. at 130. 
283. Id. at 131. 
284. Id. 
285. JONES, supra note 41, at 179. 
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Vesey and five leaders were tried, convicted, and executed on July 2, 
1822.286  “Only one leader confessed,” all others “remained silent.”287  
Devaney and Wilson were emancipated by the legislature and given 
lifetime pensions.288  Pencil received $1,000 and a tax exemption.289 
Both before and after the planned Prosser and Vesey rebellions, 
slaves betrayed in advance many lesser-known insurrections.  An early 
instance is the betrayal by Will of a conspiracy by slaves in Surrey and 
James City Counties, Virginia, in 1710.290  A few years later, in 1713 in 
Goose Creek, South Carolina, a slave named Job revealed a 
conspiracy.291  In Charles Town, South Carolina in 1740, a slave named 
Peter revealed a conspiracy twenty-four hours before it was to be 
initiated, allowing slaveholders to capture the rebels and execute 
them.292 
In 1835 in South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana, domestic slaves 
revealed slave plots against Whites.293  In October 1837, in Rapides 
Parish, Louisiana, Lewis, a slave, revealed a conspiracy of slaves and 
free Blacks that was set to begin in Alexandria, Louisiana.294  His 
revelation led the conspiracy to be squelched.295  The state freed Lewis 
 
286. BENNETT, supra note 81, at 131. 
287. Id. 
288. JONES, supra note 41, at 179. 
289. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 271 n.21 (citing An Act for the Remuneration of 
Peter, of George Pencil, and of — Scott, no. 2299, § V, in 6 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, supra note 140, at 194, 195) (calling him “Pencell” and mentioning only $1,000); 
JONES, supra note 41, at 179. 
290. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 170.  Will was rewarded by the legislature purchasing 
his freedom for £40.  Id. 
291. See id. at 173–74.  An entry in the Journals of the Commons House of the 
Assembly, Columbia, South Carolina indicates that the Assembly agreed to pay a slave 
named Job £5 for revealing in 1713 a slave conspiracy.  Id. at 174 (quoting MS JOURNALS OF 
THE COMMONS HOUSE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA (May 11, 1715), 
microformed on Collection of Early State Records, A.1b, Reel 1, Unit 4 (Lib. of Congress)). 
292. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 189 & n.77.  Peter was awarded a suit, hat, shoes, 
stockings, and £20.  Id. at 189 n.77. 
293. See id. at 328 (recounting how, in October 1835, in South Carolina and Georgia, 
“[a]n old domestic slave revealed . . . a plan for rebellion”); id. at 329 (“In December 
[1835,] . . . a ‘confidential servant’ . . . in East Feliciana, Louisiana” revealed a serious plot by 
two Whites and “a great many of the most favorite confidential servants,” making “it all the 
more disturbing.” (quoting Letter to a Member of Congress, Dated December 29, 1835, from  
New Orleans, 49 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 331 (1836))). 
294. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 330. 
295. Id. at 330. 
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and rewarded him with $500 to “establish himself in some distant 
community where he would be safe.”296 
In June 1853, in New Orleans, Louisiana, Albert, a slave, asked 
George Wright, a free Black, to join a rebellion in the planning.297  
Wright expressed interest and Albert took Wright to meet Dyson, a 
White teacher from Jamaica.298  Dyson, trusting Wright, urged Wright to 
join.299  Wright seemed committed, but immediately revealed the plot, 
leading police to Albert.300  In July 1859, in Clarksburg, Virginia (now 
West Virginia), a female slave revealed a plot.301 
As with rebellions, research also establishes examples of instances in 
which slaves betrayed escapees.  Disclosing their whereabouts could be 
serious betrayal.  Henry Bibb, a runaway slave, was betrayed not once 
but twice.302  In 1840, Lew Cheney, a slave, had organized “a mass flight” 
of slaves from Rapides and Avoyelles Parishes, Louisiana, to Mexico, 
but Cheney himself revealed the plot to his owner “to curry favor.”303  
More extreme than mere information disclosure, some slaves went so 
far as to assist slaveholders in capturing runaways.304  For example, 
George and Jim, two slaves, were accused of killing Isaac, another 
slave.305  Their alleged motive for the killing was that Isaac “had 
combined with the white folks to betray George to the sheriff, and it was 
thought he was also engaged to apprehend Jim.”306 
 
296. See id. at 330 n.17 (citing ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO 
SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS 
DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION RÉGIME 486 (1918)). 
297. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 343. 
298. Id. at 343. 
299. Id. at 343–44. 
300. See id. at 343–44. 
301. Id. at 351. 
302. See discussion supra notes 229–35 and accompanying text. 
303. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 334 & n.33 (quoting NORTHUP, supra note 111, at 
189).  Cheney survived Whites’ mass executions and was rewarded.  NORTHUP, supra note 
111, at 189 & n.2.  “[H]is name is despised and execrated by all his race throughout the 
parishes of Rapides and Avoyelles.”  Id. at 189. 
304. JONES, supra note 41, at 168. 
305. Jim v. State, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 145, 145 (1844). 
306. Id. at 151. 
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VI. A BRIEF DEFENSE OF DOMESTIC SLAVES 
Slaves who worked in the owner’s household or performed in 
domestic roles were known as house slaves.307  During slavery, house 
slaves were known or reputed to have been willing to do the bidding of 
White owners, including informing, to the detriment of other slaves.308  
Today, house slaves are still vilified in the Black community and being 
called a house slave is a serious insult.309  Quite possibly, house slaves 
may be the subject of unfair criticism. 
Historian Herbert Aptheker opined that spies and traitors primarily 
came from the domestic class.310  He contended that owners encouraged 
domestics to maintain distance from field workers.311  Presumably, the 
lack of connection to other slaves promoted owner loyalty over 
allegiance to other slaves, and thus a willingness to protect a master’s 
interests.312  Aptheker’s position finds support in both the reporting of 
unsuccessful slave rebellions and first-person slave accounts.313 
Some house slaves did reveal rebellion plots beforehand, allowing 
the plans to be quashed before getting underway.  In South Carolina 
and Georgia in October 1835, “[a]n old domestic slave revealed . . . a 
plan for rebellion.”314  In East Feliciana, Louisiana in December 1835, a 
“confidential servant” revealed a “serious” plot by two Whites and “a 
great many of the most favorite confidential servants,” making “it all the 
more disturbing.”315  Denmark Vesey’s plot on Charleston, South 
Carolina, was undone in whole or part by a house slave.316  Beck, a 
young slave girl who considered herself a house slave, testified against 
alleged members of Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia, although she did 
not betray the rebellion beforehand.317 
 
307. See JONES, supra note 41, at 113. 
308. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 61–63. 
309. See, e.g., Steven Zeitchik, The Contenders: Slavery, Comedy and Guns, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 27, 2012, at S24 (describing Samuel L. Jackson’s character in Django Unchained, a 
domestic slave who snitches, as “one of the most despised Negroes in cinematic history”). 
310. APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 61. 
311. See id. at 62. 
312. See id. at 62–63. 
313. See id. at 62, 328 (citing BIBB, supra note 228, at 136). 
314. See APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 328. 
315. See id. at 329 (quoting Letter to a Member of Congress, Dated December 29, 1835, 
from New Orleans, 49 NILES’ WEEKLY REGISTER 331 (1836)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
316. See discussion supra Part V. 
317. SCOT FRENCH, THE REBELLIOUS SLAVE: NAT TURNER IN AMERICAN MEMORY 
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Likewise, some house slaves betrayed runaway slaves.  Harriet 
Jacobs, who was secreted from her master in the house of her 
grandmother, was twice almost betrayed by a domestic servant.318 
In stepped Jenny, the mischievous housemaid, who had tried to 
enter my room, when I was concealed in the house of my white 
benefactress. . . .  I had slunk down behind a barrel, which 
entirely screened me, but I imagined that Jenny was looking 
directly at the spot . . . . 
 Uncle Phillip was sent for, and he agreed with his mother in 
thinking that Jenny would inform Dr. Flint in less than twenty-
four hours.319 
 . . . . 
 Of course, the day was an anxious one for us all.  But we 
concluded that if Jenny had seen me, she would be too wise to let 
her mistress know of it; and that she probably would not get a 
chance to see Dr. Flint’s family till evening, for I knew very well 
what were the rules in that household.  I afterwards believe that 
she did not see me; for nothing ever came of it, and she was one 
of those base characters that would have jumped to betray a 
suffering fellow being for the sake of thirty pieces of silver.320 
Henry Bibb after escaping to freedom and writing his story claimed: 
[T]he domestic slaves are often found to be traitors to their own 
people, for the purpose of gaining favor with their masters; and 
they are encouraged and trained up by them to report every plot 
they know of being formed about stealing [anything], or running 
away, or [anything] of the kind; and for which they are paid.321 
Similarly, ex-slave Austin Steward offered much criticism regarding 
house slaves.322  He claimed: 
 
37–40 (2004).  Beck was a young slave girl, approximately twelve to fifteen years of age.  Id. at 
38.  She considered herself a house slave and spent the vast majority of her time with her 
mistress, rather than other slaves.  Id.  Thus, she may have been motivated to testify against 
the slaves by loyalty to her master and mistress.  See id. at 37–38.  Beck’s testimony was 
heavily challenged for its lack of credibility.  Id. at 40–41, 61–63. 
318. JACOBS, supra note 77, at 216, 254–56. 
319. Id. at 254. 
320. Id. at 255–56. 
321. BIBB, supra note 228, at 136. 
322. See LESTER, supra note 111, at 90–91 (citing CHARLES H. NICHOLS, MANY 
THOUSAND GONE: THE EX-SLAVES’ ACCOUNT OF THEIR BONDAGE AND FREEDOM 74–75 
(1963)) (revealing the beliefs of slave Austin Steward). 
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[M]any of them are the most despicable tale-bearers and 
mischief-makers, who will, for the sake of the favor of his master 
or mistress, frequently betray his fellow slave, and by tattling, get 
him severely whipped; and for these acts . . . he is often rewarded 
by his master, who knows it is for his interest to keep such ones 
about him; though he is sometimes obliged, in addition to a 
reward, to send him away, for fear of the vengeance of the 
betrayed slaves.323 
The quotes from Bibb and Steward indicate that they, and likely 
other slaves, believed Whites purposely cultivated informant behavior 
among domestic slaves, owners rewarded betrayals by house slaves, and 
owners believed what their trusted servants told them.  A domestic slave 
confirmed their beliefs: 
They taught us [domestics] to be against one another and no 
matter where you would go you would always find one that 
would be tattling and would have the white folks pecking on you.  
They would be trying to make it soft for themselves.324 
On the other hand, Historian Norrece T. Jones has observed that 
concluding domestic slaves would “betray a fellow slave for little more 
than a hand-me-down garment or a flattering remark” is overblown.325  
The story of William Hayden, a domestic slave, supports Jones’ 
proposition.326  Hayden acknowledged informing on his brethren.327  His 
motivation, though, was more significant than the mere receipt of prized 
 
323. AUSTIN STEWARD, TWENTY-TWO YEARS A SLAVE, AND FORTY YEARS A 
FREEMAN; EMBRACING A CORRESPONDENCE OF SEVERAL YEARS, WHILE PRESIDENT OF 
WILBERFORCE COLONY, LONDON, CANADA WEST 32 (Rochester, William Alling 1857) 
(detailing the beliefs of slave Austin Steward).  For an alternative version of the quote, see 
APTHEKER, supra note 37, at 62–63 (“[A] domestic slave will for the sake of his master and 
mistress, frequently betray his fellow-slave . . . he is often rewarded by his master who knows 
it is for his interest to keep such ones about him . . . hence it is that insurrections and 
stampedes are so generally detected.  Such slaves are always treated with more affability than 
others, for the slaveholder is well aware that he stands over a volcano.”). 
324. Unwritten History, in THE BOOK OF NEGRO FOLKLORE 45, 47 (Langston Hughes 
& Arna Bontemps eds., 1958); see also LESTER, supra note 111, at 90 (quoting Unwritten 
History, supra). 
325. JONES, supra note 41, at 114, 118. 
326. WILLIAM HAYDEN, NARRATIVE OF WILLIAM HAYDEN, CONTAINING A 
FAITHFUL ACCOUNT OF HIS TRAVELS FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, WHILST A SLAVE, IN THE 
SOUTH 77–78 (photo. reprint 1969) (1846); LESTER, supra note 111, at 91 (citing NICHOLS, 
supra note 322, at 85). 
327. HAYDEN, supra note 326, at 77–78. 
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clothing or owner favor: the rebellious slaves on whom he informed 
planned to kill him along with all present Whites.328 
Sleeping in a room adjacent to the slaves, who were ironed, I 
discerned enough from their conversation to enable me to know 
that a mutiny was abroad, and that it was the intention of the 
slaves, in order to effect their freedom, to put to death all the 
whites on board,—and that I, too, was included,—owing to the 
attention that was paid me,—with the doomed.  By jests and 
cheerfulness with them, however, I gathered from their detached 
hints, their every movement.  That they had even then provided 
themselves with a file from the lot of Blacksmith tools on board, 
and that many were at that moment, free from their chains.  This 
information I immediately carried to my master; and after 
ascertaining the truth of my statement, he had them again bound 
more firmly than ever.329 
Notwithstanding the firsthand accounts of slaves, without more data, 
arguably it is either speculative or erroneous to conclude that most 
Black informants were domestic slaves or that overwhelmingly domestic 
slaves were informants.  Undoubtedly, domestic slaves may have had 
special or greater incentives to inform than other slaves (e.g., owner 
loyalty, preservation of status).  They might have also had more 
opportunity and faced great pressure to betray their fellow slaves 
because of proximity to owners who sought to use them as informants. 
As a class, however, it is unclear that they were actually more likely 
to inform or more likely to be informants than other Blacks.  All 
slaves—including domestics—had to be cognizant of the repercussions 
from other slaves if they informed.330  At a minimum, they faced 
ostracism and at worst, death, and their master may have been unwilling 
or unable to protect them from either.  Further, at some point all slaves 
probably needed the benefit of a slave code of silence for much conduct 
could be deemed misconduct by owners.  And while some domestic 
slaves might have had few close relations with other slaves, others 
probably had relationships worth prioritizing.  Thus, many domestics 
who could have informed on another slave would have had strong 
incentive not to do so. 
 
328. Id. 
329. Id. (relaying the account of slave William Hayden). 
330. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
DENNIS-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2014  4:38 PM 
328 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
VII. THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCES OF INFORMANTS 
By now it is clear that Whites undertook efforts to promote 
informing by Blacks, and that some Blacks did in fact inform while 
others refused to do so.  However, ascertaining the extent of informing 
and refusals and other discerning elements such as who might be more 
or less likely to inform and under what circumstances is nearly 
impossible.  What can also be preliminarily gleaned from the data, 
although more nuanced definitive conclusions cannot be drawn, is that 
White efforts to promote informing and Black informants themselves 
contributed to division and distrust within, and inaction by, the Black 
community during slavery. 
Some slaves distrusted their brethren due to their knowledge or 
suspicion. Whites intentionally sought to divide slaves and develop a 
cadre of informants by, among other means, favoring some slaves over 
others, rewarding the provision of information, and using Black 
religious leaders to detect slave misconduct.331  By way of example, 
escaped slave Frederick Douglass emphatically proclaimed: “The motto 
which I adopted when I started from slavery was this—‘Trust no man!’  I 
saw in every white man an enemy, and in almost every colored man 
cause for distrust.”332  Douglass probably was not alone in his 
perspective, although he may have been the most public voice on the 
topic. 
If slaves distrusted each other, then Professor Norrece Jones’ claim 
that the potential for betrayals did more to deter rebellions than the lack 
of weapons, information, or organization is not surprising.333  According 
to Jones, as far as slaves were concerned, and as far as appeared true, 
rebellions were always betrayed beforehand.334  The many infamous and 
less well-known rebellions that were squelched due to Black informants 
support this contention.335  Consequently, it is understandable if many 
slaves completely avoided rebellious efforts because they reasonably 
expected their efforts to be unsuccessful. 
Even for those slaves willing to contemplate organized resistance, 
the few rebellions that were successful, in whole or part, reveal how 
difficult it was to keep a rebellion-in-waiting from being betrayed and 
 
331. See discussion supra Part III. 
332. See DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 98. 
333. See JONES, supra note 41, at 182, 191. 
334. Id. at 191 (citing HIGGINSON, supra note 258, at 248). 
335. See supra Part V. 
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forestalled.  Such difficulty could serve as a strong disincentive to act.  
The Nat Turner Rebellion in 1831 Southampton, Virginia, is the most 
well-known, successful slave-led rebellion.336  Ultimately, Turner was 
captured alive, and before his execution, he recounted the events to 
Thomas Gray, who officially recorded Turner’s confession.337  Assuming 
the credibility of Turner’s confession to Gray, Turner’s version of events 
reveals the great lengths he went to in order to keep his plans secret and 
how luck was sometimes necessary to avoid other slaves preemptively 
revealing information to Whites.338 
Turner believed God had commanded him to rebel and that he was 
to not tell anyone until he received a sign.339  When he received the sign, 
he told “four in whom [he] had the greatest confidence, (Henry, Hark, 
Nelson, and Sam).”340  They worked together to come up with plans but 
rejected them all.341  Turner then received another sign that told him 
they could wait no longer.342  So, the group agreed on August 20, 1831, to 
meet the next evening over dinner to finalize a plan.343  When the five 
met, they were joined by Will and Jack.344  Turner provided no 
explanation as to how Will and Jack came to be invited, except that Jack 
“was only a tool in the hands of Hark.”345  They all agreed to start the 
insurrection that night—Sunday—at the house of Turner’s master and in 
fact did so.346  Their killing spree began and spread.347  Other slaves 
 
336. Jennifer L. Larson, A Rebellion to Remember: The Legacy of Nat Turner, 
DOCUMENTING THE AMERICAN SOUTH, http://docsouth.unc.edu/highlights/turner.html (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013); U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Slave Rebellions, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
http://www.nps.gov/subjects/ugrr/discover_history/slave-rebellions.htm (last updated Sept. 6, 
2011). 
337. NAT TURNER & THOMAS R. GRAY, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER, THE 
LEADER OF THE LATE INSURRECTION IN SOUTHAMPTON, VA. AS FULLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY MADE TO THOMAS R. GRAY 3–4 (Richmond, Thomas R. Gray 1832). 
338. Id. at 10–11.  Gray’s credibility in recording Turner’s confession is debated.  See 
Brophy, supra note 156, at 1860 n.300 (identifying various positions regarding the credibility 
of Gray’s taking of Turner’s confession). 
339. TURNER & GRAY, supra note 337, at 9–10. 
340. Id. at 10. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. (describing the meeting and preparation on the night of August 20th); Larson, 
supra note 336 (stating that the rebellion began on August 21, 1831). 
345. TURNER & GRAY, supra note 337, at 10–11. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. at 11–14. 
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joined as they went along; the group numbered fifteen men, then about 
forty, then fifty or sixty members.348 
Eventually the group encountered White resistance that forced the 
group to separate.349  Turner sent two men (Jacob and Nat) to find 
Henry, Sam, Nelson, and Hark and tell them to meet him where they 
had dinner the Sunday before.350  By Wednesday, when no one had 
joined him and he saw White men riding around looking like they were 
searching for someone, Turner “concluded Jacob and Nat had been 
taken, and compelled to betray” him.351  He hid in the woods for six 
weeks and was only discovered due to a dog that came across his cave 
where Turner had a piece of meat.352  When the dog passed by the cave 
again, this time accompanied by two slaves, the dog alerted to the 
cave.353  Turner thought he was discovered and so made himself 
known.354  The two slaves ran off and Turner knew “they would betray” 
him.355  So he left that hiding place and was free for two more weeks 
before being discovered.356 
A number of factors arguably explain the relative success of Turner 
and his band.  First, Turner did not initially reveal his intentions to 
anyone, and when eventually he did, he only did so to a close-knit, small 
group who kept his silence.357  Second, the group was successful for quite 
some time because it endeavored to kill every White person it came 
across and because other slaves did not seem to be running to warn 
White folks, either because they had joined the rebellion or feared the 
rebels.358  Thus, it took some time for the White community to be put on 
notice and gather itself to respond.  Even then, though, the response did 
not come because any slave betrayed the group.359  Finally, Turner’s 
success might have been primarily based on luck.  While Turner and his 
co-conspirators were tight-lipped about their plan, there does not 
 
348. See id. at 12–14. 
349. Id. at 14–15. 
350. Id. at 16–17. 
351. Id. at 17. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 10–11. 
358. See id. at 11–12. 
359. Id. at 14–15. 
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appear to have been a strong effort to maintain silence, which stands in 
stark contrast to the controlled, large-scale planning effort of Denmark 
Vesey and his second-in-command.360  Vesey and his group of 
accomplices took great pains to control information flow to prevent a 
betrayal; yet, betrayed they were.361  Turner, contrastingly, did not take 
such significant measures, and happenstance was likely the reason he 
was not betrayed beforehand.362 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
With limited exception, scholars of any discipline have yet to 
robustly explore Blacks’ experience with informing, much less during 
slavery.  Documenting and studying the socio-legal historical experience 
of Black Americans with informing affords scholars the opportunity to 
consider what these past findings may mean for the present.  This 
Article offers the beginnings of an historical description, drawing on a 
number of sources to broadly describe the experience of Black slaves, 
and occasionally free Blacks, as informants.  Undoubtedly, as this is not 
an exhaustive account, there is more historical work to be done.  
Continuing generally to search for information wherever it may be 
found and wherever it leads might be one approach.  Alternatively, 
research might focus specifically.  For instance, in-depth examination on 
informing in particular Southern colonies or states or during particular 
time periods would be fruitful.  Work might closely examine the use of 
informants for particular types of misconduct.  Finally, an interesting 
comparison would be that of slave informants in the South as compared 
to the North, or on plantations in contrast to more urban or populated 
areas. 
How might the information herein inform our thinking today?  
Admittedly, there are patently significant differences between the Black 
community’s position today and during slave times that may undermine 
analysis of the present implications of history today.  The most apparent 
 
360. See discussion supra Part VI. 
361. See BENNETT, supra note 81, at 129–31. 
362. Compare id., with TURNER & GRAY, supra note 337, at 10.  Though Turner’s 
planned rebellion was not revealed before it began, it is worth noting that slaves did testify 
against other slaves charged with crimes.  See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 & n.45, 
1850, 1879.  For example, a participant named Moses and an uninvolved house slave named 
Beck both testified.  See FRENCH, supra note 317, at 37–41, 61–63 (discussing Beck’s 
testimony); Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 n.45 (describing Moses’ role).  He may have been 
motivated by criminal leniency and she by loyalty to her mistress.  See FRENCH, supra note 
317, at 37–41, 61–63; Brophy, supra note 156, at 1825 n.45. 
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distinction is that Blacks are no longer enslaved and so are not focused 
on the fundamental recognition of their individual and collective 
humanity.  Rather, they benefit from significantly more social and legal 
protections than during slavery, even if still marginalized.  Additionally, 
informing on fellow slave subjects poses greater moral dilemma than 
informing on neighbors who prey on the community.  Indeed, during 
slavery, informing on seriously troublesome Blacks was sanctioned. 
Notwithstanding the distinctions, the historical snapshot developed 
herein reveals many similarities between the Black experience with 
informing then and today.  For example, societal justification for 
informants then and now—necessity—remains the same, and 
government-offered incentives to inform existed during slavery and 
continue at present.363  Moreover, individual and communal response 
among Blacks was ambivalent in both eras.  Finally, the negative 
impacts of informants on the Black community then and today remain 
quite similar. 
These resemblances lend support to referencing Black historical 
experience when considering modern informant law and policy.  A few 
suggestions follow.  First, we could recognize that a formal criminal 
justice system less reliant on informants is not unprecedented.  During 
slavery, the government endorsement of informants in the Black 
community was limited to the most necessary of circumstances that 
benefited (White) society.364  In contrast, the use of informants today is 
widespread, reaching all manner of conduct and having widespread 
collateral impacts.365  This expansion of the government’s reliance on 
informants might be partially explainable by the move away from 
private prosecution and the growth in the number of crimes since 
slavery,366 but the narrow use of informants during slavery at least 
presents one model for government. 
Second, rather than demonizing members of the Black community 
for holding an anti-cooperative ethic, we might understand that Black 
contestation is legitimately rooted and not abnormal.  As during slavery, 
Black folks today, individually and on a communal level, do not speak 
 
363. See HARNEY & CROSS, supra note 3, at 12, 14 (discussing former law enforcement 
officers’ recognition of the necessity of informants); Natapoff, Communal Consequences, 
supra note 2, at 652, 660–61; Hampson, supra note 3 (quoting Pittsburgh police commander: 
“Informers are a necessary evil”); see also supra Part II.A; see, e.g., supra Part III.K. 
364. See supra Part II.A.  
365. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 3, 35. 
366. See BLOOM, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
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with one voice on the topic.  Viewpoints on snitching and informing are 
highly contested and deeply entrenched.  On one hand, some argue that 
informing and government promotion of informing is necessary to 
prevent and solve crime, particularly Black-on-Black crime; and that the 
penalties for not informing make the decision to inform appropriate.367  
On the other hand, it is argued that informing leads to unnecessary and 
disproportionate incarceration of Blacks, particularly Black men;368 
invites and contributes to government abuses, such as police brutality 
and unreliable convictions;369 fractionates the Black community by 
pitting community members, friends, and family members against each 
other;370 and exposes Blacks to retaliation that the government is 
unwilling or unable to prevent, thus making the stakes too high for the 
individual and community.371  It is apparent, then, that the slave 
perspective and modern Black viewpoint are quite similar if not 
identical.  The community ambivalence is old and longstanding. 
What might explain this longstanding schizophrenia?  Laws and the 
experience of law influence social behaviors and perspectives.  Norms 
are transmitted from generation to generation.  History tells us that 
American society has long been quite willing to police and foment 
disunity in the Black community by actively promoting informing.  
Consequently, rebutting Black folks’ entrenched conceptions regarding 
informing may prove more difficult than expected.  Understanding 
history helps to depolarize the debate surrounding informants and 
allows for meaningful, honest conversation on whether the Black 
community as a whole should endorse informing; whether Blacks should 
engage in the practice; and how the government should respond to the 
Black perspective—whether well-founded or not. 
Relatedly, a final potential application of the history revealed herein 
is to the development of responses to the Stop Snitching motto and 
broad-based code of silence adhered to by some in the Black 
community.  Government responses have been varied, including 
 
367. See BUTLER, supra note 6, at 79–100 (summarizing the debate surrounding 
informing); WILLIAMS, supra note 14 at 111–18 (decrying the growth of the Stop Snitching 
movement for its increase in Black crime). 
368. See Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 683–85. 
369. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 69, 126–28; Natapoff, 
Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 663–64. 
370. Natapoff, Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 690–92. 
371. See NATAPOFF, CRIMINAL INFORMANTS, supra note 2, at 129–30; Natapoff, 
Communal Consequences, supra note 2, at 689–90. 
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increased protection of witnesses and the enactment of public relations 
campaigns that encourage the reporting of crime and cooperation with 
police.372  Yet none of these solutions adequately account for the 
potential legitimacy of anti-cooperation and robust social and moral 
ambivalence Blacks hold toward informing.  Government officials 
recognize that deep mistrust of law enforcement discourages 
informing.373  Nonetheless, the solutions tend toward a utilitarian cost-
benefit rationale, emphasizing decreased penalties for informants, 
physical safety of informants, and community benefit.  Understanding 
the complexity of viewpoints and genuinely reflecting such in solution-
generating, however, might generate different responses. 
 
372. See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 10, at 31–33, 38–39 
(describing the creation of an anonymous tip program in Washington, D.C. and the “Keep 
Talking” campaign instituted by the Baltimore Police Department in response to Stop 
Snitching). 
373. See id. 
